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In mid-2007, Energy Fuels, a Toronto-based uranium mining and milling company, 
announced their intent to build Piñon Ridge, the first new conventional uranium mill in the 
United States in 30 years. The prospect of a return to uranium milling has mobilized community 
support to bring back an industry some see as both familiar and capable of supporting and 
growing their communities. Using transcripts generated during the Colorado Department of 
Public Health and Environment’s public meetings and hearings during 2010 and 2012, this study 
examines how proponents of the mill frame the socioeconomic advantages of bringing the 
industry back. Applying Kinsella’s bounded constitutive model of communication, this study 
shows that the community and the uranium mill are bound in a “sorge-enframing” duality where 
the care generated by each binds the other to the recalcitrant nature of the uranium industry and 
preconceived notions of socioeconomic development, respectively. This conclusion suggests that 
current public engagement processes associated with uranium mill licensing fail to address the 
complex social and economic issues surrounding the uranium industry, limiting the ability for 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1: THE NEW NUCLEAR WEST................................................................................ 1 
The New Nuclear West: What is it? ............................................................................................ 3 
Overview of Study ................................................................................................................... 6 
Why Piñon Ridge? ...................................................................................................................... 8 
Previous Studies on Piñon Ridge .............................................................................................. 10 
Uranium Milling ........................................................................................................................ 10 
Uranium Milling Regulation ..................................................................................................... 12 
Modern Federal Regulation of Uranium ............................................................................... 13 
Agreement States Program .................................................................................................... 14 
Overview of Energy Fuels and the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill ................................................ 15 
Energy Fuels’ Piñon Ridge: A Symbol of the Future? ............................................................. 18 
Overview of Chapters................................................................................................................ 19 
CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATON ............................ 21 
Chapter Overview ..................................................................................................................... 23 
Nuclear Communication ........................................................................................................... 24 
The Fabulous Textuality: Early Nuclear Communication Studies ........................................ 25 




Environmental Communication – Beyond Human Constructs ................................................. 30 
Oravec, Rogers, and the Foundation of Environmental Communication ................................. 32 
Nuclear and Environmental Communication: A Nexus ............................................................ 34 
Public Participation and Nuclear and Environmental Communication in the 21
st
 Century ...... 36 
Nuclear Weapons Complex Studies .......................................................................................... 37 
Nuclear Waste Sitting Controversies ........................................................................................ 39 
The Material and Symbolic Aspects of Nuclear Technology ................................................... 43 
Heidegger and Being at the Hanford Reservation ................................................................. 44 
The Bounded Constitutive Model and the Goshute Nuclear Waste Controversy ................. 46 
Implications of Clarke’s Study and the Necessity for Examining Proponents ......................... 48 
CHAPTER 3: THE URANIUM INDUSTRY IN WESTERN COLORADO .............................. 51 
Radium Industry Boom and Bust (1898 – 1937) ...................................................................... 53 
Early Carnotite Exploration on the Plateau ........................................................................... 54 
Radium Industry Development .............................................................................................. 55 
Radium Industry Bust ............................................................................................................ 57 
Myth of the Radium Industry ................................................................................................ 58 
Federal Uranium Industry Boom and Bust (1938 – 1970) ........................................................ 60 
Wartime Uranium and Vanadium Extraction and Processing ............................................... 61 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Circulars ...................................................................... 62 
Uranium Rush ........................................................................................................................ 65 
Stretch Out Period ................................................................................................................. 70 
Commercial Boom and Bust (1971 – 1984).............................................................................. 74 




The Uranium Cartel ............................................................................................................... 77 
Boom and Bust ...................................................................................................................... 78 
Piñon Ridge, White Mesa, and the Legacy of Bob Adams ....................................................... 80 
CHAPTER 4: PIÑON RIDGE ...................................................................................................... 82 
Politics, Policy, and Piñon Ridge after 2010 ............................................................................. 84 
Public Engagement and the Agreement States Program ........................................................... 85 
Piñon Ridge Legal Battle and New Hearing ............................................................................. 87 
Piñon Ridge Today .................................................................................................................... 89 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 90 
Uranium Mining and Milling as Community ............................................................................ 94 
Uranium Mining and Milling as Family ................................................................................... 96 
Family as Past and Future ...................................................................................................... 98 
Uranium Mining and Milling as Fatalism ............................................................................... 101 
Fatalism as Past and Future ................................................................................................. 104 
Uranium Mining and Milling as Expertise .............................................................................. 109 
Expertise in the Past and Future? ........................................................................................ 110 
Uranium Futures ...................................................................................................................... 113 
Moving Forward ...................................................................................................................... 115 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 117 
Public Engagement Beyond Piñon Ridge ............................................................................... 121 
The New Nuclear West’s Future ............................................................................................. 124 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................. 129 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1. Map of the West End with proposed Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill site........................ 17 
Figure 3.1. AEC and Spot Market Yellowcake Prices, 1948-2012 .............................................. 79 

























I would like to acknowledge the tireless efforts of my thesis advisor, Jen Schneider, who 
I very much doubt expected that overly talkative and somewhat suspicious first semester 
graduate student in her Nuclear Power and Public Policy class to decide on making the switch 
from engineering to the social sciences and humanities. Jen’s guidance, patience, and friendship 
during this process were invaluable, and I hope the work contained in this document do her 
efforts justice. I would also like to acknowledge my committee chair, Jason Delborne, who has 
provided a great deal of advice in his own right over the last two years, as well as the opportunity 
to connect with a number of science and technology policy scholars outside of this institution. In 
addition, I would like to acknowledge MIPER Director Kathleen Hancock and NSE Program 
Interim Director Jeffrey King, both who worked with Jen and myself to make this work possible.   
On a personal note, I would like to acknowledge my friends and family who, whether 
they realize it or not, played a big part in this document. To my friends Allison, Briana, Carl, 
Satira, and Savannah: thank you for your various contributions throughout this research. Each of 
you has played a part in the creation of this document, and in turn there is a little of each of you 
in it. Last, but not least, I want to thank my parents, Carl and Faye, and my brother, William. 
You have spent more time listening to me go on about my research than any family should, and I 
cannot possibly express my love for you in words. This document is a product of your teachings, 
the many phone conversations, talks in the car, and too many mornings sitting in the living room 
drinking Turkish coffee talking about the nature of the universe. I can only hope that one day I 






THE NEW NUCLEAR WEST 
 During my third semester at the Colorado School of Mines, I decided to improve upon 
my communication skills and take a class in Advanced Science Communication that my advisor 
was teaching. One of the major pieces of that class was a blog, specifically a science blog, which 
presented my research in a way that was accessible to a general audience. For one of the posts in 
this blog, I had to produce a video about a topic of relevance to my research. Given that the 
Colorado School of Mines is about 20 minutes south of one of the former sites in the nuclear 
weapons complex, Rocky Flats, I felt that a video about its history would be appropriate for a 
primarily Coloradan audience. I was mistaken. As the instructor booted up my video to present 
to the class, I asked everyone if they knew about Rocky Flats. Less than a third acknowledged 
the name meant anything to them.  
This apparent lack of recognition of one of the most important sites in the nuclear 
weapons complex—the aggregate of various laboratories, manufacturing facilities, and testing 
sites that constitute the U.S. nuclear weapons program—perplexed me. Since the beginning of 
the Manhattan Project during World War II, the American West, specifically Idaho, Utah, 
Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Washington, have functioned as a 
critical part of the development of nuclear technology in the United States. This region, named 
“The Nuclear West” by Raye Ringholz, was a region where the material reality of nuclear 
technology, primarily in the form of nuclear weapons and the associated materials and sites 
necessary to build and test them, were part of the everyday experiences of many. Naturally, 




1950s, the Miss Atomic Bombs of Las Vegas, the Uranium Capitals of the World (Moab, Utah, 
and Grants, New Mexico) as well as the countless television shows, comic books, and other such 
pop culture items turned what was once contained within the rocks of the region into a 
significant piece of American society (Amundson, 2003, 2004; Johnson, 2012, pp. 21-25). In 
turn, the confluence of the material reality of nuclear technology and the symbolic function it 
played in society created a completely new set of material aspects, all of these inexorably tied 
together in the Nuclear West.  
 Still, the Nuclear West was not as one-dimensional, or cheerful, as the pop culture icons 
it produced would suggest. The material reality of nuclear technology takes many forms, and the 
significant health and environmental effects it had upon such groups as those living near the 
Hanford Site and on the Navajo Reservation, created symbolic meanings all their own. Upon 
realization that the numerous health and environmental effects residents near the Hanford 
Nuclear Reservation experienced were linked to the site itself, they co-opted the concept of being 
“downwind” of a nuclear weapons test into a state of being, “downwinder” (Kinsella, 2001a; 
Peeples, 2011). Similarly, Navajo who lived and worked near sites of uranium mining and 
milling treated the material believed to cause many health effects as a monster, and in Navajo 
tradition, gave it a name, leetso (Benally, 2006a, p. 14). 
 In this case, decades of environmental and health mismanagement meant that the 
material reality of the nuclear past bred a set of material and symbolic conditions that pervade 
the American West to this day. To draw from Gabrielle Hecht’s concept of nuclearity, the 
various political, economic, cultural, and social factors that brought about the Nuclear West 
jointly constituted the world in which westerners grappled, and in some cases continue to grapple 




is to better understand how these material and symbolic relationships between nuclear 
technology and the people who associate with it impact current debates over the uranium 
industry in western Colorado. If the “old” Nuclear West was a product of the confluence of 
material and symbolic aspects of nuclear technology, understanding what and how the “new” 
Nuclear West factors into the future of the nuclear power industry globally will require a similar 
analytical approach.  
The New Nuclear West: What is it? 
 Between the beginning of the Manhattan Project and the end of the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s purchase of processed uranium oxide, or yellowcake, in 1970, the large majority 
of uranium mined and milled in the United States went towards the nation’s nuclear weapons 
program and weapons material stockpiles. With the conclusion of the Cold War, however, the 
Nuclear West has taken on a new dimension. While my use of the phrase “New Nuclear West” 
echoes the still widely held belief of an “Old” and “New” American West, my frame is more 
along the lines of Patricia Nelson Limerick’s argument in The Legacy of Conquest that the 
history of the west is a continuum of experiences, rather than a segmented set of events 
(Limerick, 2006).  
I define the New Nuclear West as the product of a gradual shift in the technopolitical 
center-of-balance associated with nuclear technology in the American West since the end of the 
Cold War, away from nuclear weapons, and towards nuclear waste disposal, and to a lesser 
extent, uranium mining and milling. This shift is a product of four main aspects of the evolution 
of the relationship between communities, the nuclear industry, and the government in the 
American West:  





2.  Lack of federal support for uranium industry development,  
3.  The nature of the current global uranium market, and  
4.  The purported “nuclear renaissance” underway.  
 
As the issues associated with managing the ever-growing amount of spent nuclear fuel 
generated from the 104 nuclear reactors in operation in the United States continue to grow, 
solutions on how to manage that waste continue to incite a great deal of debate amongst 
scientists, policymakers, and citizens. The most widely known case is that of Yucca Mountain, 
the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository adjacent to the Nevada National Security Site 
(formerly Nevada Test Site). Lesser known sites include the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
in Carlsbad, New Mexico, which serves as the disposal site for transuranic (TRU) wastes 
generated by the nuclear weapons complex, EnergySolutions’ Clive, Utah, low-level waste 
disposal site, and the proposed temporary high level wasted storage site on the Skull Valley 
Goshute Reservation in western Utah (Morgan, 2008; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012b; 
Peeples, Krannich, & Weiss, 2008). While many of these sites have a strong connection with the 
nuclear weapons complex (e.g., Yucca Mountain is adjacent to the Nevada National Security 
Site), the majority of the debate over these sites focuses on the ecological, health, and social 
consequences of them rather than their military legacy.  
Along the same lines, the uranium industry, the oldest segment of the nuclear power 
industry, has gone from a virtual fiefdom of the federal government to an environment where 
uranium industry members tend to regard federal policies associated with their business with a 
certain amount of suspicion. During the two previous uranium boom and bust periods of the 
1950s and 70s, federal economic interventionism, particularly in the form of set prices and 
restrictions on trade, provided the uranium industry an opportunity to grow. With the withdrawal 




decades of ecological and health effects associated with uranium mining and milling, could no 
longer expect the federal government to keep them functioning.  
Today, global nuclear power development and geopolitics drive the industry’s future. In 
2011, total yellowcake production in the United States was around 4 million pounds, much 
smaller than the 37 million pounds produced by the domestic industry in 1960, and less than a 
tenth of the annual yellowcake production of Kazakhstan (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982; 
Solovyov & Nurshayeva, 2012; United States Energy Information Administration, 2012). The 
uranium industry is now a global business as uranium producers such as Denison Mines, Areva, 
Rio Tinto, Kazatoprom, Cameco and others vie for uranium deposits in places such as Australia, 
Niger, Namibia, and Uzbekistan. These operations, specifically those in Africa and Asia, have 
enormous potential and little of the political risk (from an investment perspective) associated 
with their heavily regulated U.S. counterparts (Hecht, 2012, pp. 324-325).  
This, however, does not mean that the uranium industry in the United States does not 
have a role to play in the 21
st
 century. With the advent of a “nuclear renaissance” – a potential 
boom period in nuclear power development across the globe – mining companies are once again 
beginning to look to the earliest sites of uranium mining and milling on the Colorado Plateau for 
a shot at getting a cut of the potential 98,000 to 136,000 metric tons of yellowcake demand by 
2035 (Nuclear News, 2012c; Tompkins, 2012). Whether or not there is a “nuclear renaissance” 
underway is debatable, and such speculation is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, 
the significant number of reactors under construction in the developing world (26 in China alone) 
signifies that if a nuclear renaissance is underway, it will most certainly mean a greater need for 
uranium extraction and processing overall (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012b). In 




Resources in Arizona and AUC LLC in Wyoming, are moving to acquire the proper mining 
permits for their land acquisitions in preparation for operations when market conditions are right 
(Nuclear News, 2012a, 2012b).  
Since some of these uranium mining operations will require milling, the process whereby 
uranium ore extracted by traditional mining methods is turned into yellowcake, Energy Fuels, a 
Canadian uranium company is pursuing a license to construct a uranium mill in western 
Montrose County, Colorado (Energy Fuels, 2007). If built, the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill would 
become the first conventional uranium mill built in the U.S. since the White Mesa Mill in 1980. 
It would also become the first mill built in western Colorado since the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s (AEC) ore buying programs of the 1950s and 60s. Piñon Ridge will be a product 
of the New Nuclear West, but it will also be continuing a legacy of uranium mining and milling 
in western Colorado that dates back over 110 years. This legacy, and how proponents of the mill 
project frame the material and symbolic aspects of the return of the industry to western Colorado, 
is the focal point through which this research will study the material and symbolic aspects of 
uranium mining and milling the 21
st
 century.  
Overview of Study 
 The overarching objective of my study is to understand how the material and symbolic 
aspects of economic development associated with the uranium industry, specifically in western 
Colorado. To accomplish this, I will draw from the fields of environmental and nuclear 
communication, specifically William Kinsella’s bounded-constitutive model of communication, 
to address how the confluence of the material and symbolic aspects of communication associated 
with uranium milling explain why and how proponents see the mill as a necessary part of their 




my research seeks to answer the following question: how do proponents of the Piñon Ridge 
Uranium Mill frame the socioeconomic advantages of revitalizing the uranium industry in 
western Colorado?  
I have chosen to focus my analysis on how proponents view the socioeconomic effect of 
bringing the industry back to western Colorado for two reasons. No study in environmental and 
nuclear communication has, as of yet, focused on uranium mining and milling. Studies such as 
Endres’ (2009a, 2009b) examination of the American Indians and nuclear technology make 
mention of uranium mining and milling as one of the significant injustices perpetrated upon 
American Indians in the American West, but do not examine the issue much further. My study 
will serve to both expand upon current themes and theories in environmental and nuclear 
communication, and fill this gap in the field. In addition, the majority of studies on the 
aforementioned aspects of the New Nuclear West focus on the legacies associated with nuclear 
weapons, as well as the social and environmental movements associated with communities 
debating over their future relationship with nuclear technology. The primary focus of these 
studies are the Yucca Mountain waste repository in Nevada, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 
New Mexico, the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in Utah, and the Hanford Reservation in 
Washington state (Clarke, 2010; Kinsella, 2007; Morgan, 2008; Peeples, 2011).  
By examining the socioeconomic aspects of uranium mining and milling from a 
communication perspective, my study will weave together communication studies and current 
studies on the history and culture of nuclear technology in the American West in a way that will 
produce a more complete picture of the nature of the complex relationship between westerners 
and nuclear technology. In doing so, this study will address a side of the nuclear power industry 




milling in the region has of yet been ignored in favor of examining the communities and groups 
against nuclear technology projects. Such an approach is both novel in terms of the mineral 
processing end of nuclear power and in line with the work of previous scholars in environmental 
communication (e.g., Clarke, 2010; Peeples, Krannich, and Weiss, 2008) who have already 
acknowledged the importance of studying those who welcome nuclear materials in their 
communities.  
Beyond this main question, my study seeks to answer a few fundamental questions about 
the social nature of uranium mining and milling in the 21
st
 century, and the regulatory processes 
associated with the development of projects. Phenomenological models of communication, like 
the one developed by Kinsella, attempt to orient statements made by individuals of interest 
within space and time. This study will seek to determine how proponents of the Piñon Ridge 
Uranium Mill orient their argumentation within space and time. Similar to Hecht’s nuclearity, 
the orientation of statements by proponents in space and time allows for a better understanding 
of how the legacy of uranium mining and milling in the American West plays into the ongoing 
debate. Such an orientation also allows for a better understanding of whether or not current 
public engagement processes associated with uranium mill siting effectively address public 
concerns. My study will also seek to answer this question, and in turn, address what changes, if 
any, are necessary in the current public engagement process.  
Why Piñon Ridge? 
 An important question at this juncture is, why Piñon Ridge? Why study a uranium 
milling project in western Colorado in comparison to, for example, Virginia Energy Resources’ 
proposed uranium mine and mill in Coles Hill, Virginia? The immediate answer to this is 




in the United States since Energy Fuels Nuclear (not the same company, but associated) 
completed the White Mesa Mill in Blanding, Utah, in 1980 (Energy Fuels Nuclear, 1980). At a 
deeper level, Colorado is the home of uranium extraction and processing in the United States for 
the purposes of intentionally extracting radioactive materials. The earliest accounts of uranium 
mining and milling in Colorado date back to 1898, where the discovery of the element radium, a 
product of uranium decay, led to a rush for any and all high-grade (high uranium content) ore in 
western Colorado (Dare, Lindblom, & Soulé, 1955). Colorado was also one of the first states to 
negotiate with the Atomic Energy Commission for the rights to manage the regulation of 
uranium mills under the 1959 Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Mogren, 2002, pp. 
137-138; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982).  
While other states might provide opportunities for studying one of these two aspects, only 
Colorado has both the longstanding uranium mining and milling tradition and an internally 
managed regulatory process with a proposed uranium mill in that licensing process. Furthermore, 
the current regulatory process in Colorado, as managed by the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment (CDPHE), has produced a wealth of data in the form of transcripts from 
the two public meetings in 2010 and the recent hearing in November 2012. These documents are 
ideal for a study of this nature as they provide an opportunity to examine the unfiltered 
statements of proponents of the mill in a setting where they are actively trying to convince the 
CDPHE to approve the project. Moreover, by examining the transcripts produced during the 
regulation-mandated public engagement process, we can answer the question as to what the 




Previous Studies on Piñon Ridge 
To date, only one other scholar, Stephanie Ann Malin, has conducted a study of the social 
and environmental controversies surrounding the Piñon Ridge project. Malin’s study, completed 
in 2011, employs Polanyi’s double movement theory to examine the effect of social and policy-
based factors on the emergence of social movements associated with uranium mining and milling 
(Malin, 2011, p. 25). Of particular interest to Malin is the implied technological and social 
“sustainability” of nuclear power expressed by proponents of the technology via the overarching 
narrative of the nuclear renaissance. To this end, Malin concludes it is difficult at this present 
time to call nuclear power sustainable from a social perspective, due to the lack of 
acknowledgement of the industry’s health and environmental legacy, and the social discord it 
creates in communities such as those in western Colorado (Malin, 2011, pp. 200-201). While this 
study draws on Malin’s work, it differs in that it addresses whether or not the question of legacy, 
in this case from an economic development perspective, plays a role in proponents’ 
argumentation for Piñon Ridge. Thus, the two studies in conjunction will serve to examine the 
health, environmental, and economic effects of uranium mining and milling in western Colorado, 
painting a more complete picture of how the legacy of uranium mining and milling plays a role 
in the nature of the New Nuclear West.  
Uranium Milling 
 What is uranium milling? My experience with the nuclear engineering community 
suggests that even nuclear engineers do not always fully understand the process, and they are 
expected to understand the basics of nuclear fuels. This is because uranium milling involves 
complex and variable processes, worth at least a cursory description here.  Uranium milling is, in 




(sometimes called pitchblende), are processed in such a way as to extract a nearly pure stream of 
uranium oxide (U3O8), commonly known as yellowcake (Cochran & Tsoulfanidis, 1990, p. 35). 
Uranium milling, sometimes called conventional milling, dates back to the radium industry of 
the early 1900s (Shumway, 1970). Today’s techniques, however, have more to do with the 
developments during the Manhattan Project in World War II. Manhattan Engineer District 
(MED) engineers, needing to extract uranium from the low grade (low uranium concentration) 
carnotite ores common on the Colorado Plateau, used a process called acid-leaching to extract 
uranium from the uranium and vanadium-bearing carnotite ore (Merritt, 1971, p. 23).  
Similarly, Piñon Ridge will use a acid leach system for separating the uranium and 
vanadium into separate streams, both of which will be sold (Energy Fuels & Visus Consulting 
Group, 2009, p. 13). In any acid-leach uranium milling process, the first step in the leaching 
process is a crushing/grinding where the uranium bearing rock coming from the mine is crushed 
in such a way as to take the rock down to an appropriate size (typically between a granule and a 
fine powder) for the leaching process (Merritt, 1971, p. 47). This material is then put into a 
slurry, and subjected to a dilute solution of acid, typically sulfuric acid (Gupta & Singh, 2003, p. 
85). For uranium ores like those found on the Colorado Plateau, sulfuric acid is the preferred 
acid, as uranium- and vanadium-bearing ores are highly soluble in such an environment. Good 
leaching also requires the presence of an oxidant, which improves the rate at which the reaction 
occurs, and in rubber lined vessels, as the slurry would quickly eat away at a metal container 
(Gittus, 1963, p. 32).  
After the leaching is finished, the uranium- and vanadium-bearing liquid goes through a 
decantation process to remove unnecessary liquid and rock (commonly known as tailings), and 




“extraction” and “stripping” process where an organic solvent phase (the extractant) extracts the 
desired metal, in this case uranium, from an aqueous phase. Once the uranium is in the organic 
phase, the uranium-bearing organic phase goes through another process where the uranium is 
stripped out of the organic phase, and into another aqueous phase. Now in a concentrated form, 
the uranium is precipitated from the liquid, filtered, dried, and then packaged for shipment. The 
current design of Piñon Ridge employs a hydrogen peroxide precipitation process, which is both 
easy to handle and less environmentally problematic than other options (Gupta & Singh, 2003, p. 
230). Yellowcake produced at uranium mills goes on to another chemical plant, typically called a 
conversion facility, where further chemical processing occurs in preparation for enrichment.  
Uranium Milling Regulation 
 The licensing and oversight of uranium milling operations in the United States is, at a 
high level, the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, because of the 
nature of the 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC has entered into 
agreements with 37 states to devolve regulatory authority for specific nuclear materials to the 
state and the state’s respective regulatory agency. Below, I will provide a general explanation of 
the overarching legal structure that dictates current uranium milling regulations, specifically the 
relationship between the state of Colorado and the NRC via the NRC-State of Colorado 
Agreement to devolve regulatory authority for uranium mill operation to Colorado. This system, 
known as the Agreement States Program, is critically important to understanding the State of 
Colorado’s obligation to include the public in the uranium mill license evaluation process. While 
the legal process did not play a direct role in generating public statements for/against Piñon 
Ridge, the public engagement mandated by the NRC-Colorado agreement, combined with the 




Chapter 4, I will go into the specific details of these events, along with a more in-depth 
explanation of Colorado’s public engagement processes associated with uranium mill licensing.  
Modern Federal Regulation of Uranium 
Current management of nuclear materials in the United States falls under the authority of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a “daughter” of the first civilian agency to manage nuclear 
materials after World War II, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). After a decade of 
intensifying debate over the validity of mandating that the AEC both promote the development a 
privately owned nuclear power industry and provide sufficient regulation to protect public health 
and safety, President Ford signed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which dismantled the 
Atomic Energy Commission, and replaced it with the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ("Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended," 2011). The first of these agencies, the ERDA, 
consolidated with other agencies in the late 70s to form the Department of Energy (DOE); the 
NRC exists today in roughly the same form ("Department of Energy Organization Act," 1977). 
At a high level, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s mission is “To license and regulate the 
nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials in order to ensure the 
adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and 
to protect the environment” (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012a). Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) contains all the regulations that pertain to the responsibilities of 
the NRC. Of particular interest to the study of uranium milling is section 40.4, which pertains to 
the licensing of source materials, i.e. those materials that are ("10 C.F.R.," 1999):  
(1) Uranium or thorium, or any combination thereof, in any physical or chemical form or 
(2) ores which contain by weight one twentieth of one percent (0.05%) or more of: (i) 
Uranium, (ii) thorium or (iii) any combination thereof. Source material does not include 




While section 40 does not note any need for public engagement concerning the process, 
section 150 stipulates that states managing the regulation of uranium mills through the 
Agreement States program must provide the opportunity for public participation in the licensing 
decision-making process. This stipulation, a product of the 1981 amendment to the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, is the legal basis for the current structure of Colorado’s agreement with the 
NRC, and consequent state regulations. Piñon Ridge may not fall under the purview of the NRC 
itself, but through Colorado’s agreement with the NRC, as outlined below, the licensing process 
used to approve/deny the mill license must concur with NRC regulations.  
 Agreement States Program 
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
can enter into “agreements” with states, whereby the state takes full responsibility for the 
licensing of various radioactive materials ("Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended," 2013). A 
good way to describe this system, known as the Agreement State Program, is to think of it as a 
lease. For a period of time that depends on the state’s ability to manage the nuclear materials in 
question, the NRC devolves regulatory authority to a responsible state agency. Like a lessee, the 
state is responsible for “paying the rent”, i.e. regulating the nuclear materials in question. Within 
their own borders, the state has complete authority over the nuclear materials agreed upon. 
However, similar to a lessor, the NRC has a certain level of oversight, and through the Integrated 
Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP), evaluates state laws to “ensure that public 
health and safety are adequately protected from the potential hazards associated with the use of 
radioactive materials and that Agreement State programs are compatible with NRC's program” 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012c). In addition, the NRC can, “after reasonable notice and 




or all of its regulatory authority within a state’s boundaries (Articles of Agreement Between the 
Atomic Energy Commission and the State of Colorado, 1982). Thus, like a lessor, the NRC can 
give, evaluate, and take away authority from the state in question if they believe there is a threat 
to public health and safety.  
Since the amended version of the Agreement requires, on the part of the state of 
Colorado, compliance with all pertaining stipulations in section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, the “soft” boundaries between federal and state authority over the licensing of uranium 
mills means there is potential for a clash over jurisdiction. In the case of Piñon Ridge, 
environmental groups, feeling the CDPHE public engagement process over Piñon Ridge failed to 
meet regulatory requirements, petitioned the NRC to evaluate whether or not the state was in 
compliance, and inadvertently brought about such a clash. While this clash did not directly affect 
the regulatory process, it did highlight a significant flaw in the CDPHE’s public engagement 
process surrounding Piñon Ridge. In Chapter 4, I will go into this event in more detail and 
explain how the clash between environmental groups—specifically the Telluride-based Sheep 
Mountain Alliance (SMA)—the CDPHE, and the NRC came about, and what impact it had on 
the current debate over Piñon Ridge.   
Overview of Energy Fuels and the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill 
 While the nature of the public engagement process associated with the Piñon Ridge 
Uranium Mill project is a subject for Chapter 4, I will provide a brief overview of Energy Fuels’ 
corporate evolution, and the licensing process associated with Piñon Ridge prior to the first 
public meeting in January 2010. In 2005, George Glaiser, along with some other colleagues, 
most notably Stephen P. Antony, decided the time was right to reenter the uranium business 




processing company, and a subsidiary, Energy Fuels Resources Corp., based out of Lakewood, 
Colorado. Decades of low prices and demand had made the business undesirable, but the recent 
upswing in spot market prices, culminating in a decades-long peak around $140 per pound of 
yellowcake in July of 2007, meant that there was the potential for making a significant profit in 
the U.S. uranium mining and milling business again (The UxC Consulting Company, 2012). It 
was at about this time that Energy Fuels announced that it would seek to build Piñon Ridge, a 
combined uranium-vanadium mill, in western Montrose County, Colorado (Energy Fuels, 2007). 
If built, the mill would not only represent a new level of interest in the region unseen 
since the uranium industry collapsed in the early 1980s, but become the first uranium mill built 
in the United States since the White Mesa Mill in 1980. Almost as important as the mill is the 
mill’s proposed location, the proposed 880-acre site for Piñon Ridge, along Colorado State 
Highway 90 in the Paradox Valley west of Nucla and Naturita, Colorado, sits in one of the oldest 
known uranium mining and milling regions in the world, the Uravan Mineral Belt (Energy Fuels, 
2009; Shumway, 1970). Figure 1.1 on the next page shows the area of the West End of interest to 
this research, with the major community hub of Nucla and Naturita to the far right, the Paradox 
Valley in the center, and the western town of Bedrock to the left. Marked on the map is the rough 
location of the 880-acre site where Energy Fuels plans to build Piñon Ridge.  
Piñon Ridge, if completed, will be a standard acid-leach type uranium-vanadium mill, 
similar in purpose to the mill that ran in the now defunct town of Uravan, Colorado, to the north. 
In its current design, Piñon will be able to accept around 500 tons of uranium-vanadium bearing 
ore a day with the potential to expand up to 1,000 tons in the future (Filas, 2011). In addition, 




operate on a 24-hour-a-day, 350 days per year basis, for approximately 40 years (Energy Fuels 
Resources & Visus Consulting Group, 2009, p. 5). 
 
Figure 1.1. Map of the West End with proposed Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill site. 
(Source: Montrose County Mapping & GIS, 2012) 
 
Since the proposed location is in a region designated by Montrose County as “General 
Agricultural”, Energy Fuels was required to not only submit a license application for the 
operation of a radioactive materials processing facility to the state of Colorado, but also petition 
Montrose County for a special land use permit. This permit, submitted on July 22, 2008 and 
revised on April 14, 2009, went through a county hearing process (which is not part of this 
study), and was approved on September 30
th
 of that year (Energy Fuels Resources, 2009; 
Montrose County Board of County Commissioners, 2009).  
 During this process, Energy Fuels was also preparing the Environmental Impact report 
required by 6 CCR 1007-1 Part 18, the regulatory code pertaining to the licensing of a uranium 
or thorium processing facility, for a radioactive materials license, as well as water and air 
pollution applications for approval by the CDPHE’s respective divisions ("Rules and Regulations 




2011). From the moment of submission, the CDPHE has 30 days in which to determine whether 
or not the application is complete; if it is found to be complete, the applicant then has a 45-day 
window where they must schedule and hold the first of two public meetings mandated in the 
regulatory process (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 2009).  
In accordance with these stipulations, Energy Fuels submitted their application to the 
office of the CDPHE’s Radioactive Management Unit, directed by Steve Tarlton, on November 
16, 2009 (Antony, 2009). As the Radioactive Management Unit was reviewing Energy Fuels’ 
application, Energy Fuels moved forward with selecting both a pair of dates and times to hold 
the mandated public meetings, and an appropriate moderator. On December 28
th
, 10 days after 
approval of the application, Energy Fuels formally informed the CDPHE that they had selected 
the dates of January 21
st
 and February 17, 2010, to hold their public meetings, and had requested 
the services of a retired Montrose District Court Judge, Richard J. Brown, to moderate the 
meetings (Filas, 2009). The CDPHE subsequently approved the meeting times, locations, and 
moderator, and an official notice was issued about the meetings in early January. These two 
meetings, held at Nucla High School in Nucla, Colorado, and the Montrose Pavilion in 
Montrose, Colorado, form the first two transcripts used in my analysis, and I will discuss the 
nature of these meetings, as well as the complications arising from these meetings, further in 
Chapter 4.    
Energy Fuels’ Piñon Ridge: A Symbol of the Future?  
 Energy Fuels, like many other medium-sized uranium producers operating in the United 
States, is a product of both individuals with a long history in the uranium industry and the global 
economic upswing during the early 2000s that coincided with a renewed interest in nuclear 




6+-year project that has seen both the mill design and Energy Fuels itself transform into one of 
the preeminent uranium mining and milling companies in the United States. Energy Fuels today 
is not the Energy Fuels it was when the company began the process of seeking the necessary 
approvals to build the mill. On June 29, 2012, after months of negotiation and approvals, 
Denison Mines, a Canadian uranium mining and milling company based out of Toronto, sold 
Energy Fuels all of its U.S. operations and properties for a total cost of around $100 million U.S. 
(Denison Mines, 2012; McRann, 2012). Among Energy Fuels’ acquisitions from this deal was 
the White Mesa Mill in Blanding, Utah. In acquiring Denison’s U.S. operations, Energy Fuels 
became not only the largest producer of uranium in the U.S., but also the sole producer with any 
conventional milling capacity. In addition to the significant strength brought about from the 
Denison acquisition, on December 28, 2012, Energy Fuels acquired a 16.5% stake in Virginia 
Energy Resources Inc., the owner of the Coles Hill uranium project in Pittsylvania County, 
Virginia (Energy Fuels, 2012b, 2013). If this transaction is approved, Energy Fuels will not only 
have control of all of the conventional milling capacity in the U.S. today, but a stake in the only 
two proposed uranium mills currently moving through their respective regulatory processes.   
Overview of Chapters 
 To understand the nature of the material-symbolic relationship associated with uranium 
milling in the minds of proponents of the industry, it is important to understand the development 
of environmental and nuclear communication studies of nuclear technology in the American 
West. Chapter 2 will provide a general overview of environmental and nuclear communication, 
highlighting the foundational research in each field and showing how both fields have merged 
together in the 21
st
 century into what I contend is a single body of scholarship. This chapter will 




Clarke’s application of the theory to the case of the proposed temporary nuclear waste storage 
facility on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation.  
 Because all phenomenological models of communication, such as Kinsella’s, require 
orienting statements in both space and time, Chapter 3 will cover the evolution of the uranium 
industry in western Colorado. Rather than attempting to examine the social, economic, 
environmental, and health effects of uranium mining and milling on these communities, Chapter 
3 will only focus on the social and economic impact of the industry, paying particular attention 
to how the two interrelate and produce a “legacy” of the uranium industry that is in keeping with 
other western “myths” of development. These myths play an important part in explaining how 
proponents frame the economic advantages of bringing the industry back to western Colorado, 
specifically in terms of the relationship between the communities themselves, the corporations 
extracting and processing the uranium, and the federal government.  
 After laying the foundation for a bounded-constitutive analysis of proponents’ statements 
in favor of the mill, Chapter 4 will start out with a brief explanation of the methodology used, 
and an explanation of the legal processes that generated the transcripts used in my study. The rest 
of the chapter will focus on examining the transcripts, paying particular attention to common 
themes amongst proponents, and analyzing how these frames are organized and relate to the 
socioeconomic legacy of the uranium industry in western Colorado. Finally, Chapter 5 will 
examine the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, and address how this study 
improves our understanding of how what challenges both the industry and the community face in 
terms of bringing about socioeconomic development in the region in the 21
st








NUCLEAR AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATON 
Paul Boyer notes in his classic study of atomic culture By the Bomb’s Early Light that all 
of our cultural notions of nuclear weapons came into being within the first few years after the 
devastation wrought by the first (and only) wartime use of atomic weapons on the Japanese cities 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Boyer, 1994). It is interesting, then, to note that even as Edward 
Teller and other scientists focused on the development of the hydrogen bomb, or “Super” as it 
was known, the public had already begun to form the symbolic meanings, both for good and ill, 
of a weapon that almost none could have possibly visualized (O'Neill, 1994). The material and 
symbolic aspects of nuclear technology, as envisioned by Americans in the Post-War period, 
grew up together and in turn jointly constituted each other. Nuclear technology, and all the 
possible benefits and burdens of it, not only live in our minds, but constitute a significant part of 
one of the most important eras of the 20
th
 century, the Cold War.  
It makes sense then, that the uranium mining and milling industry, being both 
fundamental to nuclear weapons and power alike, as well as being significantly older than both, 
should also possess a similar material/symbolic bond. Using Kinsella’s (2007) bounded 
constitutive model of communication as a theoretical basis, and drawing from Clarke’s (2010) 
process for examining community voices from the Goshute waste sitting controversy, I will 
analyze the material and symbolic forces at play surrounding the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill 
project. By acknowledging a fundamental aspect of the nature of nuclear technology in society, 
Kinsella’s phenomenological model of communication is a logical hybrid of the scholarship of 




the natural world, however, I will focus my efforts on the relationship between the material 
aspects of socioeconomic growth and development associated with the uranium mill project and 
the symbolic practices employed by supporters of the mill project. I justify my shift in the focus 
of the bounded constitutive model away from “environmental” issues based on three key 
statements. First, Kinsella (2007) presents the bounded constitutive model as a tool for use 
throughout the field of communication rather than just for the study of environmental 
communication issues (p. 196). Second, Clarke’s (2010) analysis of the Goshute waste sitting 
controversy indicates that factors other than those which define nature from a strictly 
environmental perspective are significant factors in understanding the relationship between the 
material and symbolic forces at play in a nuclear controversy (p. 402). Finally, Depoe’s (2007) 
explanation of the environment as “a relational term, encompassing both interaction and effect 
between an organism (human or non-human) and its surroundings, including other organisms” 
means “the environment” is also a product of the material aspects of how humans have 
enframed, or controlled, the world (p. 2). The material of nature serves the symbolic need for 
humans to dominate it, and in turn, the confluence of the material and the symbolic create a new 
set of “material” aspects of the world through which humans can define and interact with over 
space and time.  
Economic development, in the form of communities, jobs, facilities, etc., create a set of 
symbolic meanings all their own. These symbolic meanings can take on the form of cultural 
elements (e.g. uranium café’s, Miss Uranium pageants, town names such as Uravan) and 
transcend the time and place from which they came. Through an analysis of how these material 




venture to clarify how these aspects of western Colorado’s, colloquially known as the  Western 
Slope, nuclear past do or do not affect modern nuclear sitting controversies.  
Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter, I will provide definitions for both nuclear and environmental 
communication, respectively, and highlight key works in both scholarly traditions. This analysis 
will set up the stage for examining the intersection of these two fields during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The central premise behind my approach is to emphasize that since their 
intersection, the works of nuclear and environmental communication scholars examining non-
literary modes of communication associated with nuclear technology constitute a seamless, 
single body, of scholarship. Other scholars in the fields of nuclear and environmental 
communication (e.g., Endres, 2009c; Kinsella, 2005; T. R. Peterson, 2007) have also emphasized 
the interrelatedness of the two fields. My analysis expands on their statements, and shows that 
regardless of academic boundaries, scholars in these two fields consistently publish in the same 
journals and collaborate on scholarly works related to communication and nuclear technology.  
This point is important because the merging of the two scholarly fields reflects the merging of 
environmental and nuclear concerns in the material world.  
The controversy surrounding Piñon Ridge exists not only in the present, but also in the 
past through the legacy of uranium production in western Colorado providing material for the 
nuclear weapons program, and the environmental consequences of previous mining and milling 
operations. Only by bringing the fields of nuclear and environmental communication together 
can scholars hope to address the legacy of uranium mining and milling in the American West. 
The controversy surrounding the Piñon Ridge project exists because of the confluence of social 




former, social ruin, is a product of decades of dependence upon a uranium industry that 
interventionist policies on the part of the American government kept afloat when no market 
existed for their product. The latter, environmental ruin, is appropriately enough a “byproduct” 
of both the presence of interventionist policies keeping the industry afloat, and the lack of 
environmental policies protecting community members from the radiological effects of uranium 
mill tailings. As with all aspects of the New Nuclear West, there is no practical difference 
between “nuclear” and “environmental” communication; they both address the impact of post-
war development in the American West. In this way, I argue throughout this chapter that rather 
than continue to treat nuclear communication as a distinct field of study, the shifting nature of 
discourse in the New Nuclear West indicates that scholars should openly acknowledge what they 
already practice: nuclear communication as a subset of the field of environmental 




 biennial Conference on Communication and Environment (COCE), William 
Kinsella (2001b, p. 278) defined nuclear communication as: 
A broad set of symbolic activities surrounding military and civilian nuclear technologies; 
the organizations and institutions that produce, utilize, operate, and regulate these 
technologies; and the social, political, and cultural consequences of these technologies. 
 
Utilizing a lens based on “partial and constitutive discourses suffused with cultural relations of 
power,” nuclear communication scholars examine the symbolic practices that give the world 
associated with nuclear technology, the “nuclear world”, meaning (B. C. Taylor & Kinsella, 
2007, p. 11). By generating meaning, nuclear communication gives the symbols of nuclear 
technology, be they written or spoken word, images, or communication practices, a level of 




communication allows stakeholders in communities associated with various nuclear technologies 
to interpret and form meanings about nuclear events and how these events highlight the 
interconnectedness of nuclear discourse and the material impact of nuclear technology on their 
world (Hamilton, 2003, p. 35). For example, opponents of Piñon Ridge have expressed their 
opposition to the mill due to its relationship to the material (uranium) necessary to build nuclear 
weapons. In their eyes, nuclear power and nuclear weapons are one and the same. Put into the 
terms of nuclear communication, the symbol of “the bomb” takes on meaning in their world via 
the materiality of uranium and the industry responsible for processing the material. To build a 
uranium mill means to promote the same social and political norms that brought about the mass 
production of nuclear weapons, and the consequences those weapons had on society.  
The Fabulous Textuality: Early Nuclear Communication Studies 
 In the postformalist tradition of scholarship, the work of nuclear criticism scholars is the 
earliest formal study of the intersection of communication and nuclear technology. In the words 
of Bryan C. Taylor, one of the founding scholars of nuclear communication, nuclear criticism is, 
at its core, the exploration of “how, under particular historical circumstances, certain texts 
inscribed with particular beliefs and power-relations achieve cultural authority as ‘truth’” (B. C. 
Taylor, 1992, pp. 430-431, emphasis in original). Unlike modern nuclear communication, 
nuclear criticism focuses the majority of its attention on literature, popular culture, and political 
discourse, rather than discourse arising from the interaction between communities and local 
nuclear industrial sites (B. C. Taylor & Kinsella, 2007, p. 9). Consequently, nuclear criticism 
does not advocate any particular action or policy, but serves to increase “our understanding of 
the dialectical relationship between communication and social relations” (Hubbard, 1997, p. 83; 




of nuclear communication, as themes arising from this segment of the greater body of work are 
fundamental to understanding how communication scholars frame human-nuclear technology 
interaction. The best place to examine early nuclear communication studies is Jacques Derrida’s 
seminal speech on language and nuclear apocalypse. 
During the early 1980s, literary scholars who were worried about the aggressive stance 
taken by the Reagan administration towards the use of nuclear weapons convened a conference 
at Cornell University to examine how literary texts and critical analysis could shape our 
understanding of the nuclear discussion. Jacques Derrida’s (1984) keynote address at the 
conference, No Apocalypse, Not Now, asserted that nuclear weapons, symbolically reduced to the 
singular “the bomb,”  are “fabulously textual” in that, “for the moment, a nuclear war has not 
taken place: one can only talk and write about it” (p. 23). While Derrida acknowledges the 
materiality of the bomb, specifically the use of the atomic bomb on Japan at the end of World 
War II, he argues that these instances are an element of a “conventional” and not “nuclear” war 
(Derrida, et al., 1984). This is a key aspect of Derrida’s analysis as it helps to formulate his 
understanding of what nuclear war would be. The reality of the nuclear age and the fiction of the 
nuclear war are distinct in some ways, but as Derrida asserts, they are not two separate things. 
Nuclear war, a “hypothesis, a phantasm, of total self-destruction,” can only be justified through 
something greater than life; it would be a war where not only the material, but the symbolic, 
language itself, would come to an end; nuclear war would be a war without a name (Derrida, et 
al., 1984, p. 30). 
Before Derrida’s speech, the nuclear criticism community consisted of a loosely 
associated group of scholars concerned with the aforementioned issues stemming from Reagan’s 




anti-nuclear and, as William Chaloupka notes in Knowing Nukes, suffered from the 
complications of trying to deconstruct something they regarded as an “unspeakable” non-event 
(Chaloupka, 1992, p. 8). Derrida’s speech highlighted this quandary: how can nuclear criticism 
scholars hope to grapple with something that is first and foremost “unspeakable” and second 
which has only occurred in simulations and war games (B. C. Taylor, 1998). Nuclear criticism 
fractured. Out of this fracture emerged two camps, one concerned with the Derridean questions 
of language and nuclear technology as they appear in popular texts, and the other focused on the 
more pragmatic issues of how to understand and ethically engage in public deliberation over 
nuclear weapons and their associated sites (B. C. Taylor, 1992, 1998). The former group of 
scholars, now regarded as the nuclear criticism branch of this break, focused on the intertexuality 
– the shaping of texts by other texts – of popular texts and other media associated with nuclear 
technology. Broadly, these scholars delved into such issues as government campaigns to 
normalize the bomb, government programs to promote the need for the bomb, popular media and 
literary portrayals of nuclear technology, and narratives of our nuclear past (Kalaikjian, 1999; 
McNamara, 2007; Mechling & Mechling, 1991, 1992; Prosise, 1998; B. C. Taylor, 1992, 2002, 
2003b, 2007a, 2007b; B. C. Taylor & Freer, 2002; B. C. Taylor & Hartnett, 2000).  
By and large the examples of nuclear criticism listed above  address elements of the “old” 
Nuclear West, specifically the production of nuclear weapons and their associated sites. 
However, one example from nuclear criticism  has bearing on Piñon Ridge, especially given the 
state’s nuclear weapons past, is Krupar and Depoe’s examination of the “nuclear triumphalist” 
frame as expressed in the debates over museums across the U.S. devoted to the nuclear weapons 
complex (Krupar & Depoe, 2007). In the case of these museums, many within a few hours 




development struggle to coalesce and influence public perceptions as the Department of Energy 
continues to reinforce the “Cold War Triumphant” paradigm. The collective struggle to come to 
terms with the complex and oft-conflicting past of nuclear technology in the American West 
means that in the sphere of public discourse, competing narratives are likely to supersede any 
attempts at addressing the material realities of our nuclear past.  
The Mundane Nuclear Texts 
 The latter fragment of nuclear criticism scholars borne from Derrida’s speech focused 
their efforts on the examination of everyday nuclear discourse, such as public comments made 
during public meetings and hearings over such issues as the cleanup of former weapons sites and 
the location of proposed nuclear waste repositories. These scholars, concerned with notions of 
power, knowledge, and discourse, concentrated their efforts on examining the more “mundane” 
aspects of nuclear technology with the hope of intervening in these processes in a productive 
manner in public deliberations. The fact that these scholars actively sought to intervene in public 
discourse differentiates them from the other branch to form after Derrida’s speech, and their 
scholarship forms the basis of the nuclear communication theory used in this examination of the 
public debate over Piñon Ridge.  
One key tradition in this strain of nuclear communication is the dialogic tradition of 
analysis. Unlike other traditions in nuclear communication, the dialogic tradition focuses 
exclusively on how nuclear discourse forms through the interaction of multiple, sometimes 
competing, discourses, each that is dependent on the cultural and historical factors associated 
with the nuclear technology at play (B. C. Taylor, 1993a, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998). An 
example of these types of studies is ethnographic analyses of personal nuclear narratives, such as 




Alamos, New Mexico, Phyllis K. Fischer, in understanding the nature of nuclear culture from the 
perspective of voices unheard in the male-dominated nuclear weapons complex (B. C. Taylor, 
1993b). By viewing Los Alamos through the account of a female resident of the city, the rational 
and orderly nature of the nuclear weapons complex is stripped away as the secretive, even 
emotionally repressed nature comes forth. 
The dialogic tradition recognizes that nuclear discourse is a product of the spatial and 
temporal factors associated with the scene in question, and that such scenes are “‘aswarm’ with 
multiple and conflicting voices of nuclear interests” (B. C. Taylor & Kinsella, 2007, p. 10). 
Given the complex and oft-conflicting nature of nuclear discourses associated with such 
controversies as Yucca Mountain, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and the Vermont 
Yankee nuclear power plant, dialogic analyses of nuclear discourse serve to highlight both the 
complexity and the interconnectedness of the material aspects of nuclear technology and the 
discourse that surrounds it (Endres, 2009a; Morgan, 2008; Watts, 2012). Dialogic analyses also 
remind us that even though nuclear technologies such as nuclear weapons, medical isotopes, and 
nuclear power, are “technically” dissimilar, the cultural commonality stemming from their 
similar history binds them together under such headings as “nuclear” or “radioactive.” It is most 
certainly this aspect of nuclear communication that drives why opponents of Piñon Ridge 
associate nuclear weapons and uranium mining and milling. Both technologies, being associated 
with things that are “nuclear” and “radioactive” by the material reality of uranium and other 
associated materials, share a common cultural ancestor, and in turn form part of the greater 
material and symbolic fabric of what constitutes nuclear culture. Dialogic analyses of nuclear 
communication also elucidate why two communities that share a common spatial denominator 




voices can explain why two individuals or groups can share a common geographical relationship, 
western Colorado, and still view uranium mining and milling as productive/destructive, 
respectively. Kinsella’s bounded-constitutive model of communication, with its emphasis on a 
phenomenological approach that orients statements within space and time, draws from this line 
of thought, and in turn emphasizes the need for orienting statements within space and time so as 
to effectively sort out the mass of conflicting and contradictory voices associated with a 
particular nuclear controversy. Later in this chapter, I will explain Kinsella’s theory in greater 
detail, and show how it provides a useful theoretical approach to the myriad challenges posed by 
the confluence of the material and they symbolic over space and time in the New Nuclear West. 
Environmental Communication – Beyond Human Constructs 
While the above section mainly dealt with the humanist elements that form Kinsella’s 
bounded-constitutive model and the greater body of modern nuclear and environmental 
communication, this section addresses the materialist notions of how the environment itself 
imparts certain constraints upon human communication. Because of the inherently material 
nature of uranium mining and milling (e.g., it can only occur in places where there are deposits 
of sufficient ore grade), human discourse associated with it has an inherent association with the 
natural world from which the ore is extracted. One common theme associated with the 
materialist approach to communication analysis is the idea of the American West as a 
“wasteland”, suitable only for exploitation and disposal, such as in Valerie Kuletz’s The Tainted 
Desert (Kuletz, 1998). Before I examine this particular application of environmental 
communication to issues of nuclear technology in the American West however, I will provide a 
brief summary of the development of environmental communication as a subfield of 




I will then examine how nuclear and environmental communication have merged, and 
consequently the materialist and humanist notions of communication surrounding nuclear 
technology.  
As part of what Tarla Rai Peterson calls a “movement towards radical democratic theory 
and practice”, environmental communication (EC) is primarily concerned with how 
communication drives the relationship between humans and the environment (Depoe, 2007, p. 4; 
Milstein, 2009, p. 345). Philosophically, environmental communication scholars hold that human 
beings need to develop a better understanding of how we collectively discover, understand, and 
define our environments (Depoe, 2007). Scholars in environmental communication seek to 
address a broad set of questions that include, but are not limited to (Depoe, 2007, p. 3): 
(1) “To what extent is any human communication ‘environmental’? In our 
communicating, how do people attempt to locate or situate themselves within a 
geographic space or cultural scene – a place – that has meaning or significance for 
their identities and relationships, for the communicative act, and for the actions 
that follow?” 
(2) “How do humans use symbolic resources to define and modify their surroundings, 
their environments, as well as the environments of other living organisms? How 
does human communication, and the actions that result from human 
communication, interact with materials systems, conditions and forces that may 
exist independently of (or despite of) human activity?” 
(3) “How might we conceive of, theorize about, and analyze human communication 
among non-human organisms, or between humans and non-humans? What might 
be the impacts of such communication for the lifeworld that all organisms 
inhabit?” 
 
Robert Cox, one of the key scholars in environmental communication and an ardent 
environmentalist, contends that environmental communication as a field of study has an inherent 
responsibility to improve society’s ability to acknowledge the environment and engage with it in 
productive and sustainable ways (Cox, 2007). While many environmental communication 
scholars share Cox’s belief that the field must actively work to prevent ecological disaster, 




taken for granted by many who struggle against the problems imposed by human-induced 
ecological degradation, should be the focus of the field (Schwarze, 2007). In either event, 
environmental communication seeks to address the relationship between humans and the natural 
world, a concept that emerged from Christine Oravec’s seminal paper on John Muir and the early 
conservation movement.   
Oravec, Rogers, and the Foundation of Environmental Communication 
Generally regarded as marking the beginning of the environmental communication field, 
Christine Oravec’s paper on John Muir and the rhetoric of preservationism addresses two 
questions central to environmental communication: (1) how do humans use symbols to orient 
themselves in their environment, and (2) how can we theorize or conceive of communication 
between humans and non-humans (Cox, 2007, p. 6). Oravec’s analysis of Muir’s writings on 
preservation show that Muir employed a two pronged process to encourage 19
th
 century 
Americans to take an interest in nature for nature’s sake. First, Muir’s writings established what 
Oravec calls the “sublime response” – the state of being so overwhelmed with the sheer size and 
complexity of nature that it makes you feel completely insignificant in the world (Oravec, 1981, 
p. 248) . With this orientation of humans and nature in place, Muir then utilized his “literary 
persona” as an experienced outdoorsman and guide to engage them, albeit vicariously, in the 
complexity of nature through story and scientific fact (Oravec, 1981, pp. 250-251). Though this 
model of communication, Muir encouraged Americans to transcend their human-focused 
concepts of the environment, and acknowledge that “nature itself, as a living, organic entity, 
made claims upon humanity’s sense of responsibility” (Oravec, 1981, p. 255). In Muir’s model, 
nature is no longer an empty vessel for human exploitation, but an organism with the ability to 




With communication reoriented to open up the possibility for a two-way dialogue with 
nature, in 1998 Rich Rogers published a key piece of research examining the relationship 
between human and non-humans. Turning the question of human communication and nature on 
its head, Rogers (1998) argues that communication scholars need to move away from asking how 
discourse effects nature, and instead ask how “nature affects discourse, and therefore, us” (p. 
247, emphasis in original). To accomplish this goal, Rogers draws from a mélange of 
Nietzschean philosophy and ecological feminism to deconstruct the idealist notion that nature is 
separate from human communication and social processes (Rogers, 1998). Rogers calls for a 
shift away from idealist notions of nature and communication towards a “transhuman, 
materialist, theory of communication.” Criteria for such a theory could, according to Rogers, 
include acknowledging natural forces into communication theory; reaffirming the 
complimentary, rather than superior, relationship between humans and nature; exploring ways to 
communicate with non-humans,; and provide a breaking down of the dichotomous notions of 
reality, such as the boundaries between the material and symbolic aspects of our world (Rogers, 
1998, p. 268).  
The importance of the material-symbolic relationship in environmental communication 
cannot be understated. Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson (2007) express this fundamental shift in 
the way we humans view ourselves in relation to the world as the act of “debunking human 
exceptionalism” (p. 76). If humans are no longer exceptional – unusual or extraordinary – then 
we can reach beyond the confines of Plato’s cave paradigm and understand how we relate, and 
can communicate, with extrahuman others such as plants, animals, and landscapes (T. R. 
Peterson, 2007). As Carbaugh (2007) expressed in his essay on Quoting the Environment, “the 




nature’s world” (p. 68).  Environmental communication in many ways strives to reach this lofty 
goal, and in turn influences other communication studies such as nuclear communication, which 
are also concerned with the relationship between the materiality of nature and the symbolic 
practices of humans.  
While Kinsella’s theory does not explicitly draw from Rogers’ conceptualization of the 
material-symbolic relationship, the value of a material-symbolic relationship to communication 
studies allows for the incorporation of not only the natural world, but, when put in conjunction 
with nuclear communication studies, human-generated material aspects of our world. Piñon 
Ridge, being only a short distance from many of the earliest uranium mills built in the U.S., 
exists in a space where material reality for many is the multitude of mines and towns once 
devoted to the industry. As I will show in Chapter 4, proponents of Piñon Ridge see uranium 
milling as an extension of the landscapes they grew up in, a constant in their lives that predates 
living memory, and in turn an extension of the material world. While this worldview is 
incongruent with the overarching ides of Rogers’ materialist theory of communication, Clarke 
(2010) points out that in the case of Kinsella’s model, cultural notions of the relationship 
between the material and the symbolic differ from between proponents and opponents of nuclear 
technology projects. Thus, whether we agree with these alternate viewpoints or not, they deserve 
careful study if we are to understand all of the relationships between communities in the New 
Nuclear West and uranium mining and milling.    
Nuclear and Environmental Communication: A Nexus  
The two major events that mark the integration of nuclear and environmental 
communication are the 1999 Conference on Communication and Environment (COCE) in 




were four papers presented on nuclear communication and the environment. The themes of these 
papers covered four major topics of interest for 21
st
 century nuclear communication scholarship: 
public participation at nuclear weapons sites, public response to nuclear waste siting, nuclear 
technology and mass communication, and theoretical frames for the study of nuclear 
communication (International Environmental Communication Association, 2012).  
The second major event, the publication of Nuclear Legacies in 2007, marks the 
intersection of nuclear and environmental communication scholars in a book-length work 
exclusively focused on nuclear technology. Bringing together the work of four of the most 
influential scholars in nuclear and environmental communication, Bryan C. Taylor, William J. 
Kinsella, Stephen P. Depoe, and Maribeth S. Metzler, the collection of papers signifies the 
scholarly merger of researchers who self-identify in both fields of study. Tarla Rai Peterson, one 
of the preeminent scholars in environmental communication, provides the capstone for Nuclear 
Legacies by analyzing what nuclear and environmental communication can teach each other. In 
terms of what nuclear communication can teach environmental communication, Peterson 
indicates the relevance of the “stewardship” trope as it relates to both nuclear material and 
environmental issues, and the value of careful and highly systematic processes for analyzing 
communication from public participation processes seen at former weapons sites and potential 
nuclear waste sites (T. R. Peterson, 2007, pp. 243-244). As to what environmental 
communication can provide nuclear communication, Peterson suggests that nuclear 
communication scholars who, much like environmental communication scholars, are involved in 
a subject that could be considered a “crisis discipline”, would benefit from a formal discussion of 
how scholars can “most profitably respond” to nuclear crises (T. R. Peterson, 2007, p. 245). 




these two fields of study. Environmental communication alone has the capacity to address the 
discourse of proponents/opponents of the project in relation to the health and environmental 
effects of the industry, but not the issues of culture, economics, and power associated with the 
“nuclear” aspects of the proposed mill. By bringing these two fields together, communication 
scholars can develop a more systems-oriented approach to understanding what impact nuclear 
technology has on the human-constructed and natural world.  
Scholars engaged at this nexus of nuclear and environmental communication have 
focused their efforts on three major subsets of nuclear technology: nuclear waste, nuclear 
weapons, and nuclear power. Of the three, nuclear waste and weapons sites are of great interest 
to scholars following the dialogic strain of nuclear and environmental communication. In both 
cases, scholars are focused on aspects of how the public participates in the decision making 
processes related to these sites and the processes through which people for or against a particular 
site conceptualize the relationship between the material (environment, weapon) and the symbolic 
(language, imagery, etc.). Below, I will examine these two major themes brought about by the 
nexus of nuclear and environmental communication, and their contributions to our understanding 
of nuclear technology in our modern world.  
Public Participation and Nuclear and Environmental Communication in the 21
st
 Century 
The “nuclear public sphere” as described by Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, and Metzler (2005) 
is a system centered on the concept of containment, be that material or discursive. Material 
containment is a product of the “need” to control the releases of radioactive materials either in 
the form of materials and technologies necessary to build a nuclear weapon, or, to a lesser extent, 
for health and environmental protection. Discursive containment during the Cold War was a 




was necessary for “national security,” even if it left communities unaware of the environmental 
or radiological hazards they faced. After the end of the Cold War, the structure of discursive 
containment shifted from information to interpretation, whereby the authority to speak about 
nuclear issues rather than the information itself was limited to scientific experts (Kinsella, 2001a, 
p. 189; Kinsella & Mullen, 2007, p. 80). It is because of these rigid constraints imposed on the 
structures and pathways of communicating about nuclear issues that Kinsella (2005) describes 
nuclear discourse as a “relatively recalcitrant system of meanings that enable, constrain, and 
structure environmental communication in significant ways” (p. 50). Recent nuclear and 
environmental communication studies on the public participation processes at Fernald, Yucca 
Mountain, and the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation have challenged preconceived notions of 
good public participation processes, evaluated competing narratives in nuclear/environmental 
controversies, and examined how the public circumvents the constraints of technocratic public 
participation processes.   
Nuclear Weapons Complex Studies 
Communication scholarship surrounding public participation at former sites in the 
nuclear weapons complex focuses on the efforts through which federal agencies, community 
stakeholder groups, and other regional/national interest groups interact with each other as they 
jointly attempt to navigate the question of how to deal with the social and environmental legacies 
left by these sites. Locations that are of particular interest to nuclear and environmental 
communication scholars in the 21
st
 century include the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in 
Richland, Washington, and the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center in Fernald, Ohio. Two 
key authors in this field of analysis are Maribeth Metzler and Jennifer Duffield Hamilton. 




that private organizations (such as government contractors in charge of a DOE site) operating in 
and or associated with sites of common concern for a community are implicitly subject to 
scrutiny in the public sphere (p. 352). Hamilton’s dissertation and subsequent publications 
extend this question of public participation, organizations, and Fernald, through an in-depth 
examination of the communication “epochs” in public participation at the Fernald site extending 
from 1984 to 2003. Focusing primarily on the major players in the Fernald cleanup (DOE 
officials, EPA regulators, and members of a community action group, Fernald Residents for 
Environmental Safety and Health), Hamilton examines the perspective each stakeholder group 
holds towards the role of public participation in the cleanup decision-making process (Hamilton, 
2003, pp. 11, 51). Two major conclusions for public participation and nuclear communication 
studies from Hamilton’s analyses are the impact of balancing global and local issues on 
participation and decision-making and the nature of what constitutes an “effective public 
engagement process.” Hamilton’s (2005) analysis of the controversy over extracting radium at 
Fernald for cancer research highlights how when communities are faced with the “sacrifice for 
the common good” paradigm, stakeholders will establish meaning for particular events based on 
their goals, and the respective narrative sphere (medicine to cure cancer vs. cleaning up Fernald 
as planned) into which they fit (pp. 93-94).  
Along the same lines, the constant shift in priorities and perspectives associated with the 
complex social and environmental effects of nuclear weapons sites create a “revolving door” 
where conflict and confrontation will inevitably emerge/reemerge. The key, according to 
Hamilton, is not to focus on effective public engagement processes, but simply keep the dialogue 
going (Hamilton, 2003, pp. 327-329). By promoting a system of public participation based on 




constitutes a “good outcome” for public participation shifts from one that generates consensus to 
one that generates a healthy and respectful discussion amongst stakeholders (Hamilton, 2007, p. 
65; Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006, pp. 770-771).   
Nuclear Waste Sitting Controversies 
Summarizing nuclear waste and communication studies, Taylor (2003a, p. 287) asserts 
that:  
Eschewing objectivist concern with the accuracy of these discourses, these studies instead 
evaluate the process through which the parties interact. Specifically, they criticize an 
arrogant and instrumental orientation among officials and experts towards engineering 
public communication so that it conforms to preferred identities, relationships, and 
processes.  
 
Given the historical precedent for agencies to engage in decide-announce-defend (Cox, 2006, p. 
105) practices when confronted with adhering to regulatory standards for public participation 
(such as those outlined by NEPA or NWPA) Taylor’s assertion is a valid, if unapologetic one. 
Unlike in the case of nuclear weapons complex sites, the environmental and radiological 
concerns associated with nuclear waste are a product of discourse rather than immediate material 
reality. Consequently, the debates over nuclear waste sitting controversies create divides in the 
public unseen in public participation processes over waste cleanup. Two key sites for 
communication scholarship associated with nuclear waste are the now defunct Yucca Mountain 
Repository in Nevada and the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in western Utah. Scholars 
examining these sites have evaluated the structure of the public participation processes, focusing 
on public argumentation and use of science.  
Given that both of these sites form the core of the nuclear waste aspect of the New 
Nuclear West, examining the lessons learned from their public engagement processes provides 




proponents and opponents of the Skull Valley temporary storage facility grapples with an aspect 
of nuclear technology in the American West that few environmental communication scholars 
address: communities might actually want to accept nuclear waste in exchange for economic 
benefits. Similarly, Endres’ examination of how everyday citizens apply science and the 
scientific method to argue against the approval of the Yucca Mountain repository shows that 
even in a space dominated by technocratic expertise, everyday citizens can influence the 
direction of a licensing debate. Below I will provide a summary of each of these studies, and 
expand on how they influence my current analysis of the Piñon Ridge controversy.  
 Peeples et. al’s (2008) examination of the nuclear waste sitting controversy surrounding 
the proposed high level waste repository on the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in western 
Utah is the first comprehensive synthesis of the narratives employed by proponents of a nuclear 
site. The structure of the proponents’ narratives are segmented based on whether they were 
employed by the Skull Valley Band itself, the nuclear power consortium Private Fuel Storage 
(PFS), or community members outside of the tribe who favored the waste storage facility. Each 
of these narratives serves to form a piece of the meta-narrative surrounding the facility. 
According to Peeples et. al (2008), the meta narrative established by proponents of the facility 
drew on themes of self-determination and freedom that are central to the identity of people living 
in the American West, but failed to “establish who would be responsible for the safety of the 
people surrounding the facility” (p. 55).  
The Skull Valley Band’s narrative focused on establishing the tribe as the agent in 
support of the facility, emphasizing the tribal leadership’s ability to make technically informed 
decisions about nuclear waste that would be of both economic and environmental benefit to the 




reinforcing the supremacy of technical knowledge, either through self-cited “experts” or the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) licensing process (Peeples, et al., 2008, p. 49). Outside 
of the reservation itself, proponents in the local Utahan communities focused their efforts on the 
opponents of the project, arguing that opponents were acting irrationally and furthermore 
denying the Goshutes their “right” to the waste site (Peeples, et al., 2008, p. 51). In isolation, 
each of these narratives presents a compelling argument for supporting the waste site, but in 
combination they illuminate the fact that the proponents as a whole did not agree on who was 
actually responsible for protecting the public. Such a conclusion becomes even more important 
given that the final group of stakeholders, proponents of the project outside of the reservation, 
flies in the face of the commonly accepted notion that no one wants to accept nuclear waste into 
their community.  
The importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated. Supporters of Piñon Ridge also 
show that while there is a great number of health and ecological consequences of uranium 
mining and milling, these consequences do not serve as a barrier dissuading communities from 
welcoming the social and economic benefits it may potentially bring. It is likely that Tracylee 
Clarke was keenly aware of this contradiction, the idea that a community wanted nuclear “waste” 
that drew her to apply Kinsella’s bounded-constitutive model. Proponents and opponents of 
Piñon Ridge inside and outside of the communities in western Colorado exhibit similar traits, 
and echo Peeples et al’s amalgam of overlapping and contradictory narratives. Indeed, the 
intersection of social, economic, health, and environmental issues over the “body” of nuclear 
technology in the New Nuclear West seems to continually produce a paradoxical relationship.  
Extending on the themes of technocratic dominance of public participation processes as 




information during the public participation processes surrounding the Yucca Mountain waste 
repository site. Using Kinsella’s (2004) concept of public expertise, Endres examines how the 
public uses science through her concept of public scientific argument. Public scientific argument 
is, unlike the types of public expertise laid out by Kinsella and Mullen (2007), centered on how 
non-credentialed, non-scientist individuals (1) use scientific data produced by credentialed 
scientists, (2) highlight flaws in the scientific method, and (3) produce in-house scientific data to 
support claims (Endres, 2009c, p. 55). Through an analysis of the rhetorical strategies employed 
by the public, Endres argues that the public can have success in employing scientific data, but 
this data must be utilized through structured rhetorical and argumentative strategies that employ 
peer-reviewed data (Endres, 2009c, p. 66).  Such successes on the part of the public indicate that 
current technocratic structures for public participation should be altered to acknowledge the 
ability of the general public to “draw from local knowledge, pathos, and scientific data to make 
their claims” (Endres, 2009c, p. 67).  
Endres’s examination of Yucca Mountain focuses on the application of scientific 
information by non-credentialed, non-scientist individuals against the proposed high-level waste 
repository, but the concept is also applicable to proponents. Individuals in favor of Piñon Ridge, 
especially those who either worked in the industry during their life or had a family member or 
spouse who did, utilize reports furnished by industry organizations, state and federal agencies, 
and university research groups to support their claims that uranium milling is not hazardous to 
workers’ health. Expanding this concept along the lines Endres proposes further, the economic 
reports brought up by a multitude of sources, both private citizens and local industry groups, 
should also factor into the decision making process. This extension of Endres’ conclusions not 




but also opens up the possibility of using a material-symbolic model of communication such as 
Kinsella’s to examine how proponents employ such information in their argumentation for 
approving the Piñon Ridge license. In the next section, I will delve into the theoretical basis of 
Kinsella’s model, and how that model allows nuclear and environmental communication scholars 
studying the New Nuclear West to bring together the work of Peeples et. al, Endres, Hamilton, 
and others in a  theoretical frame capable of engaging with the myriad material and symbolic 
aspects of the New Nuclear West.     
The Material and Symbolic Aspects of Nuclear Technology 
Kinsella’s (2001a) analysis of the material and discursive containment aspects of the 
Hanford site in the post-Cold War era sets the stage for the translation of the interrelatedness 
between the material and symbolic highlighted by Rogers (1998). Key themes in this strain of 
nuclear communication are the transmission of nuclear-related ideographs to similar 
environmental controversies (Peeples, 2011), American Indians and the material and discursive 
forms that constrain their relationship to nuclear technology (Endres, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2012a, 
2012b), and the mutually constitutive relationship between nuclear discourse and nuclear 
materiality (Clarke, 2010; Kinsella, 2007, 2012). The latter of these strains forms the theoretical 
basis for the bounded-constitutive model of communication, which is the underlying theoretical 
basis of this work. Since the work of Endres and Peeples parallels the development of the 
bounded-constitutive model of communication, I will only focus on the work of Kinsella and 
Clarke, emphasizing the philosophy that underpins this model and how it can explain 
controversies in the New Nuclear West.  
At the end of his discussion of nuclear entelechy, the process through which one can 




(2005) remarks how the philosopher Martin Heidegger viewed technology as a tool to control, or 
apprehend, the world. Nuclear technology, as one of the “most radically interventionist” modern 
technologies, is a product of both modernist discursive processes that are embedded in 
Enlightenment ideas of restructuring the world to meet human needs, and something wholly new 
(Kinsella, 2005, p. 67). Nuclear discourse is, at its core, about the conquest of the atom, the 
subjugation of nature for human needs. However, in conquering the atom, we have inadvertently 
created a system of domination where, in the name of “conquering the atom,” society, culture, 
and politics are subservient as well. Below, I will explain Kinsella’s use of Heideggerian thought 
to explain the relationship between human beings and nature through what he calls the “bounded 
constitutive” model of communication. 
Heidegger and Being at the Hanford Reservation  
William Kinsella uses a story about the reverence Department of Energy employees show 
the cougars that roam though the restricted area near where the old Hanford N-Reactor releases 
radioactive effluent to highlight that “ambiguous relationships between cougars and humans, 
nature and culture, the material and the discursive, pose important problems for environmental 
communication theory” (DOE Office of Environmental Management, 2012; Kinsella, 2007, p. 
195). These employees are humbled by the presence of these cougars in this untouched 
environment, but fail, in Kinsella’s eyes, to see the irony of an “untouched” and radioactive 
wilderness. 
To explain the complex relationship between man and cougar at Hanford, Kinsella draws 
from the work of Martin Heidegger, specifically Heidegger’s critique that humans have reduced 
nature to a “standing reserve” ripe for exploitation. Heidegger viewed nuclear technology as the 




example of enframing, the process through which the natural world becomes a standing reserve 
(Kinsella, 2007, p. 195). For Kinsella, the implications of Heidegger’s work for communication 
studies are twofold: “First, they address key theoretical issues within the discipline; and second, 
they link communication theory to the urgent, practical problems emerging from our ever-
expanding efforts to enframe the natural world” (Kinsella, 2007, p. 196). Kinsella argues that 
current communication models emphasize either language or nature, and in doing so fail to 
acknowledge the interrelatedness and interactions between the two.   
Kinsella sees Heidegger’s philosophy as an improvement over Rogers’ (1998) effort to 
deconstruct the “ideal/material distinction.” Heidegger’s theories accomplish Roger’s 
“transhuman” approach though non-naturalist ethical premises by allowing for the reorganization 
of communication in a “bounded constitutive” model. According to Kinsella (2007, p. 200): 
“In that model, humans have substantial power to constitute the world and its meanings, but that 
power is constrained by, and must be responsible to, the transcendental facility of nature.” 
In the view of Heidegger, human beings and nature are “fundamentally connected and 
profoundly interdependent” (Kinsella, 2007, p. 205). A key to shifting the relationship between 
humans and nature revolves around the concept of care or Sorge. Care, at its core, depends upon 
human beings finding the world interesting and worthy of engaging on the world’s terms. Caring 
for the world, and consequently the environment, does not just mean caring about it, but caring 
for it as well.  
Through his Heideggerian analysis of the Hanford Reservation, Kinsella examines how 
being, or das Sein, and the standing reserve create a structure for understanding the nature of a 
“bounded constitutive” model of communication. In the context of the dominant social, political, 




“standing reserve” from which nuclear materials are mined, processed, and eventually disposed 
of (Kinsella, 2007, p. 207). Human beings, through highly structured processes of resource 
management, are also reduced to either  a “human resource” for production, or, even worse, a 
“low use” community that lacks the economic or political power to object (Kinsella, 2007, pp. 
208-209). In essence, humans and nature can be, “through the atomic bomb system, science, 
technology, history, nature, and culture” unified in a bounded and constitutive relationship 
(Kinsella, 2007, p. 210). By presenting both nature and humans in a bounded manner, Kinsella 
means to tie the experiences of the world and of humanity together in a manner that generates 
productive Sorge.  
The Bounded Constitutive Model and the Goshute Nuclear Waste Controversy 
Tracylee Clarke (2010) applies Kinsella’s bounded constitutive model of communication 
to the case of the Skull Valley Goshute Indian tribe nuclear waste sitting controversy. Using a 
mix of media (radio, newspaper), government documentation (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
hearings, Tribal documents), and interviews with tribal members, Clarke collected information 
about the various cultural, historical, political, and economic forces driving the nuclear waste 
debate on the reservation (Clarke, 2010, p. 394). Clarke identified comments from tribal 
members that focused on the interplay between them or the tribe in general (the symbolic) and 
the natural world or the nuclear waste itself (material). Clarke then analyzed the comments based 
on their focus on the material or the symbolic aspects of the nuclear waste debate.  
 During her analysis, Clarke identifies that “pre-existing material conditions and the 
surrounding landscape (material) had direct bearing on not only their (the Goshute’s) political 
and cultural (symbolic) decisions, but also their relationship with the natural world” (Clarke, 




wasteland – both in terms of natural features and in terms of the preponderance of other 
environmentally hazardous sites. Clarke notes that surrounding the reservation is one of the 
largest weapons and hazardous/toxic-waste storage sites (the Utah Test and Training Range), a 
low-level nuclear waste storage site (EnergySolutions Clive, Utah site), and a mix of other 
mining and energy related production sites (Clarke, 2010, pp. 395-396). These pre-existing 
conditions, according to Clarke, dissuade environmentally friendly businesses and promote the 
“toxic” nature of the landscape. Toxicity, as a symbol of the Goshutes’ existence, in turn feeds 
political and cultural decisions that justify the storage of nuclear waste on the reservation. Hence, 
the “toxic” nature of their material world drives symbolic practices that frame the reservation as 
a wasteland only suited for disposal (Clarke, 2010, p. 398).   
Along the same lines, those who oppose siting nuclear waste on the reservation 
acknowledge the barren nature of the land they live on, but accept it as part of who they are as a 
people. The name Goshute, a derivative of the two words dust and people, is a key piece of 
evidence that the symbolic nature of what it means to be Goshute and the land are inexorably 
connected (Clarke, 2010, pp. 398-399). In the Heideggerian sense, the Daisen, or being, of the 
Goshute is tied up with the land; consequently, the destruction of the land by storing nuclear 
waste on it will in fact destroy what it means to be Goshute (Clarke, 2010, p. 400). Furthermore, 
accepting nuclear waste would not only destroy their Daisen, it would also indicate an 
abandonment of their care, or Sorge, for the natural world.  
Clarke’s analysis shows that in the case of nuclear waste sitting controversies, the 
interrelatedness of the material and symbolic aspects at play can yield unexpected, even 
conflicting results. Both sides of the argument use the lens of the material and symbolic 




sorge” (Clarke, 2010, p. 401). Clarke recognizes that devaluing the controversy at hand by opting 
for the more agreeable symbolic practices associated with environmental protection is 
unacceptable; such an act not only would devalue the people involved, but also fail to grasp how 
complex the relationship between the material and the symbolic is. Thus, scholars must be 
keenly aware that just because a particular set of symbolic practices opts for enframing the land 
in ways that are environmentally questionable does not mean that said practices are any less 
important from a cultural or even policymaking perspective. 
Implications of Clarke’s Study and the Necessity for Examining Proponents 
The implications of Clarke’s conclusions from the perspective of how to engage 
meaningfully with the material and symbolic relationships of the New Nuclear West are 
immense from a public engagement perspective. With a strong focus on the protection of the 
environment, a product of the need to treat the subject as a “crisis discipline”, environmental 
communication scholars have by in large excused the environmentally-friendly frame employed 
by opponents of nuclear technology from their implications to the material world. In reality, the 
argumentation of both proponents and opponents of the temporary waste storage site implies that 
the material world is theirs to control, or enframe, as they see fit.  
From the perspective of this work, Clarke’s conclusions draw a few key points that imply 
the necessity of studying environmental controversies such as uranium milling from a different 
angle. First, while most scholarship associated with environmental controversies focuses on 
those who are opposed to the particular project in question, Clarke’s conclusion, coupled with 
that of Peeples et. al (2008), suggests that in the context of the New Nuclear West, the 
relationships proponents of a particular project draw between the material and the symbolic 




and symbolic relationships associated with the New Nuclear West are not reserved for opponents 
alone, and understanding how proponent’s culture and community identity influence how they 
see the advantages of introducing/reintroducing nuclear technology into their community will 
enhance our understanding of the implications of the “old” Nuclear West on the new. Finally, 
given the importance of public engagement processes derived from state in federal policies in the 
siting and licensing of sites throughout the New Nuclear West, understanding whether or not 
proponents concerns are being addressed in the process will improve the level and quality of 
communication between citizens, the company in question, and the responsible regulatory 
agency.  
My analysis seeks to take the lessons learned from Clarke’s analysis and apply them to 
another key aspect of the New Nuclear West. The bounded constitutive model of communication 
provides the space necessary to expand beyond question of the environment in a strictly 
ecological sense, and allows for the consideration of other material aspects of the world. 
Uranium milling, much like nuclear waste disposal, is a uniquely western experience, steeped in 
the cultural implications of western history and society. Thus, I argue that uranium mills, as a 
longstanding part of the material world for western Coloradans, constitutes a human generated 
extension of the material world. The mill, and the uranium ore necessary to produce yellowcake, 
have existed in one form or another for over 100 years in western Colorado, long before towns 
such as Telluride made the switch from mining and milling to tourism in the 1960s and 70s. 
Understanding why and how proponents see Piñon Ridge as a necessary part of their 
community’s future will require acknowledging that while proponents’ argumentation may not 
be “favorable” from an ecological perspective, proponents do constitute a significant part of the 




what factors influence the siting of nuclear technology in the New Nuclear West, but improve 
our understanding of whether or not current public engagement processes effectively serve the 
needs of both proponents and opponents of any particular project.  
In the next chapter, I will outline the history of the uranium industry in western Colorado, 
paying particular attention to the western part, or West End, of Montrose County, Colorado, the 
region where Piñon, if approved, will be built. I will focus on the intersection of cultural notions 
of socioeconomic development of the region, specifically the lack of focus on the importance of 
government economic interventionism, and how such notions compare and contrast with 
historical information. This chapter will outline the overarching cultural themes that proponents 
draw from during their argumentation for Piñon Ridge, and provide the necessary backdrop for 
understanding how they see the relationship between the material and symbolic aspects of their 

















THE URANIUM INDUSTRY IN WESTERN COLORADO 
 Although nearly 120 years of U.S. history separate the first uranium boom and the 
ongoing debate over the proposed Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill project, both the proposed mill and 
the first attempts at uranium extraction for radioactive materials in the U.S. reside within the 
same band of uranium- and vanadium-bearing ore in western Colorado, the Uravan Mineral Belt. 
Materially bound together by the geology of the Colorado Plateau, Piñon Ridge is a product of 
both the current economic and social trends associated with the “nuclear renaissance” and the 
cultural and material aspects of the uranium boom and busts that preceded it. Starting with the 
radium industry of the early 1900s, and continuing onwards with the federally-driven uranium 
boom of the 1950s and the commercial boom of the 1970s, communities in western Colorado 
and eastern Utah grew, collapsed, and changed their identity, all vying for a piece of the carnotite 
and uraninite ore bodies that could change their fortunes. Enthralled with the wealth that these 
communities gained, many began to adopt the carnotite ore, the most commonly processed ore, 
as an extension of their very identity as a community. Towns began to call themselves the 
“Uranium Capital of the World” and to construct monuments, in the form of uranium-themed 
stores and community events, to the economic and social glory uranium brought (Amundson, 
2004). Uranium, once simply an aspect of the geological makeup of the region, had taken on new 
dimensions of meaning; it was at once both the source of these communities’ material wealth and 
the metaphorical banner under which they identified themselves.  
 Since the uranium industry collapsed in the early 1980s, uranium communities have 




completely, stripping away the signs of their extractive industry past in favor of tapping into the 
tourism business created by Canyonlands and Arches National Parks, as well as the lucrative 
mountain biking business (Amundson, 2003). Others, like the Union Carbide company town of 
Uravan, no longer exist, torn down by the economic reality of uranium prices and almost 50 
years of ecological damage. The towns that remain, most notably the sister towns of Nucla and 
Naturita, struggle to stay afloat, as the lack of jobs forces residents to move elsewhere, even as 
their home county of Montrose continues to grow. In this climate of double-digit unemployment 
and perennial exodus, uranium, the mineral that put these communities on the map in the first 
place, is poised to provide them what they want most: stability. Stability, though, means not only 
economic growth and development, but also identity. Earlier this year, residents of Naturita 
banded together to work to raise money to replace one of their monuments to the uranium boom, 
the Uranium Drive-In sign that, according to Naturita Mayor Tami Lowrance, possesses a 
meaning which transcends historical value (Montrose Daily Press, 2012):  “If youre [sic] from 
our area, everybody has a memory of going there or seeing the sign. This kind of brings back the 
heyday of this area, back when mining was strong and lots of families lived here.” 
 Uranium and the uranium industry function as living, breathing aspects of the 
world many second and third generation residents of western Colorado, specifically the “West 
End” of Montrose County, actively identify with. Consequently, any study of how proponents of 
uranium mining and milling frame the economic advantages of bringing the industry back first 
requires an examination of the evolution of Piñon Ridge within the context of the greater history 
of the uranium industry in western Colorado. In this chapter, I will endeavor to provide a “lay of 
the land” in relation to the history of the uranium industry in western Colorado. To accomplish 




and bust, the federal boom and bust, and the commercial boom and bust. For each segment of the 
industry’s history, I will provide a general explanation of the period in time, focusing on how the 
confluence of private industry and federal support created the industry, identify how this 
impacted the development of the uranium industry in western Colorado, and how these events 
influence the current debate over Piñon Ridge. This analysis suggests that the “new” uranium 
industry of today is in fact not distinct from the past; it is instead much like Limerick’s (2006) 
greater continuum of the American West, a continuation of decades of socioeconomic 
development driven as much by private investment as by federal paternalism. Those who support 
Piñon Ridge actively draw from the reservoir of the industry’s past in their argumentation. 
Characterizing this reservoir is the first step in understanding how proponents orient Piñon Ridge 
within the greater material and symbolic landscape of the Nuclear West.     
Radium Industry Boom and Bust (1898 – 1937)  
 Pinning down how exactly the uranium industry in the United States first came about 
requires wading through the morass of myth and legend associated with its humble beginnings. 
While providing a historical analysis of the development of myths associated with the early 
radium industry is beyond the scope of this chapter, comparing the romanticized “myth” of the 
development of the radium industry to the actual events that brought it about provides an 
excellent starting point for understanding the relationship between the physical uranium industry 
and how it symbolically functions in western Coloradan society. Radium, a product of the natural 
decay of uranium atoms, requires many of the same basic mining and milling processes required 
in uranium production. Naturally, many uranium facilities, such as the precursor to Uravan, were 




Piñon Ridge’s location in the Paradox Valley situates it within both the physical and the 
symbolic “heart” of the uranium industry. Many residents in the region can trace their families 
back to the earliest settlers, and their struggle to survive far from civilization (Locke, 1986). For 
proponents of Piñon Ridge who possess such connections to the past, the myth of how the early 
radium industry transpired, with its focus on the lone prospector, belies the influence 
international markets and the federal government had in bringing it about. To this end, I will 
provide a brief explanation of the development of the U.S. radium industry from its birth in 1898 
through its collapse in the mid-1920s and on until the start of World War II, comparing it to the 
romanticized history provided in the records of one of the uranium industry’s earliest icons, “Mr. 
Uranium,” Howard Balsley. Balsley’s narrative, though factually incorrect in many respects, is 
representative of an attitude many proponents of Piñon Ridge share towards the early history of 
the uranium industry in western Colorado, and directly impacts how said proponents frame the 
material and symbolic aspects of the industry today.  
Early Carnotite Exploration on the Plateau 
Modern scholarship on the uranium industry in the American West argues that the radium 
boom and bust was a product of scientific innovation, globalization, and government 
intervention. The first, scientific innovation, came as a product of two separate discoveries. In 
1898, miners in western Montrose County, Colorado, gave Charles Poulot, a French metallurgist 
working at the Cashin Copper Mine some 10 miles west of Naturita, samples of ore they wanted 
characterized (Dare, et al., 1955, p. 8; Shumway, 1970, p. 3; Zatterstrom, 1992). Unable to 
complete the task, Poulot sent the samples to French metallurgist Charles Freidel at the Paris 
School of Mines, who determined it was an as-of-yet-unknown sample of uranium- and 




(Shumway, 1970, p. 3). At the same time, Marie and Pierre Curie isolated the radioactive 
element radium from a sample of uraninite ore (Amundson, 2002, p. 2; Mogren, 2002, p. 20; 
New York Times, 1921). Radium, initially of value only to researchers, became a product of 
global value when scientists discovered that the radiation given off by radium could kill off 
cancerous cells. Almost overnight, radium went from scientific oddity to miracle medicine as 
scientists and doctors pursued an amalgam of different applications (Hilgartner, Bell, & 
O'Connor, 1983, pp. 2-11; Mogren, 2002, pp. 22-23).  
Radium Industry Development  
As prices for radium skyrocketed up to $120,000 a gram, carnotite ore on the Plateau, 
once unable to compete with richer deposits in Europe, was profitable, and mines and reduction 
mills came into operation to serve the processing facilities of Europe (Shumway, 1970, p. 15). 
Initially comprised of smaller operations, the sheer amount of carnotite ore necessary to produce 
even the smallest quantities of radium caused a shift in the market towards larger corporations, 
and consequently, government involvement. Prior to World War I, the majority of final radium 
production occurred in Europe; American miners and millers would process and concentrate the 
ore while European producers would produce the radium and then sell it in the U.S. market 
(Hecht, 2012; Mogren, 2002, p. 23; Shumway, 1970, p. 15). As the reality of this global radium 
industry dawned upon politicians and chemical companies, such as the Standard Chemical 
Company, they began to pursue ways to mitigate European market control. Politicians, 
specifically those associated with the Progressive movement, argued throughout 1913 and 14 
that Europeans were reaping all the benefits of American radium deposits while American 
producers saw little of the economic benefit. These progressives argued for government 




should take over the management of the business, ostensibly to protect America’s deposits from 
exploitation by foreign powers (Amundson, 2002, pp. 2-3; Shumway, 1970, pp. 17, 37).  
Conversely, corporations such as Standard Chemical sought to bring the radium 
production business to the United States through free market means. With their main facility in 
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Standard Chemical set up a local mining and processing facility in 
western Montrose County, Colorado near the confluence of the San Miguel and Dolores Rivers 
in 1913 (Amundson, 2002, p. 3). Initially known as Joe Junior, after the son of Standard 
Chemical’s owner, the town would over time and business transactions become Coke Ovens and 
then Union Carbide’s company town of Uravan (Shumway, 1970, p. 74). With a foothold in the 
primary carnotite producing region and unwilling to have the government usurp their market 
share, Standard Chemical, along with other radium producers, launched a campaign against the 
progressives. The corporations won the battle, and the government retreated from involving itself 
in the management of the American radium business (Husband, 1982, p. 18). In retrospect, it was 
for the best. As World War I broke out in Europe, the radium market began a titanic shift away 
from medical purposes towards military technologies. Radium paints are naturally luminous, and 
serve as an ideal material with which to paint dials and timepieces for troops engaged in large-
scale, highly synchronized, offensives (for a more in depth discussion of the uses and effects of 
radium, see Clark, 1997). Without competition from European refiners, the American radium 
producers, both in eastern states such as Pennsylvania and New Jersey and those in Colorado 
grew at a furious pace, such that at the conclusion of the war they dominated the global market 






Radium Industry Bust 
Trouble though, was on the horizon. Carnotite ore is not particularly rich in uranium, and 
on average a body of carnotite ore containing 2% uranium (rich by today’s standards) would 
produce a gram of radium for every 180-275 short tons of ore (Chenoweth, 1981, p. 168). By 
contrast, a rich deposit of pitchblende or uraninite ore could be upwards of 25 times the 
concentration of traditional Colorado Plateau deposits (Mogren, 2002, p. 26). In 1915, the 
Belgian Union Minere du Haute Katanga discovered a very rich deposit of uraninite in Belgian 
Congo. With the war quickly approaching and demand for uranium low, Union Minere sat on the 
find until 1922 when it announced it had found the richest deposit of uranium in the world, the 
Shinkolobwe mine. Union Minere was able almost overnight to undercut their American 
competition by 50% or more, selling radium for around $70,000 a gram (Hecht, 2012).  
Unable to complete, most radium producers shut their doors or switched to the extraction 
and processing of vanadium. From 1922 through 1937, few if any small carnotite ore processors 
existed in western Colorado. During this period in the history of uranium extraction and 
processing, uranium was a waste material from the production of vanadium from carnotite ores. 
The two main producers, United States Vanadium and the Vanadium Corporation of America, 
were global companies that spent little to any money developing facilities in western Colorado. 
United States Vanadium (USV), was an independent vanadium producer purchased by Union 
Carbide and Carbon in 1926 who had during the 1920s attempted to profit from its roscoelite 
deposits in Rifle, Colorado (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010; Shumway, 1970, p. 92). In 
1934 USV bought the remnants of the Joe Junior mill site and began to construct Uravan, a 
vanadium mining and milling site that would, with the exception of right after World War II, stay 




Protection Agency, 2010). The problem USV suffered from was a lack of vanadium market 
share. Since the early 1920s, the Vanadium Corporation of America (VCA), though its rich 
deposits in Peru, had controlled the U.S. market. In 1930, VCA attempted to build its own 
vanadium-processing mill in Naturita, Colorado, but failed to do so. USV and VCA, both 
cognizant of the precarious nature of the vanadium business knew that direct competition could 
drive both into the ground. To avoid this problem, in 1936 the two corporations entered into a 
silent agreement whereby USV would produce vanadium but sell it under the VCA banner 
(Shumway, 1970, pp. 104-105). Survival was more important than the ideals of free market 
economics and the arrangement allowed the western Coloradan communities to limp along until 
the outbreak of World War II.  
Myth of the Radium Industry 
Contrary to the actual development of the radium industry during the early 20
th
 century, 
Howard Balsley’s history of the uranium industry, drawn from information conveyed to him by 
others and his own experiences during the development of the industry, avoids the complex 
confluence of science, government, and globalization, in favor of a more romanticized vision of 
the industry. As one of the “pioneers” of the uranium industry, Balsley, or “Mr. Uranium,” as he 
would be known during the first uranium boom, was a staunch proponent of uranium extraction 
his whole life, and his word on uranium geology was regarded as nearly infallible (Ringholz, 
2002, p. 67). In turn, his take on the history of the uranium industry provides an ideal window 
through which to examine how proponents of uranium extraction frame the early history of the 
industry.  
In 1992, Robert Sullenberger published a series of articles in the Journal of the Western 




1992). In the first of these articles, Sullenberger recounts a letter from Balsley where he 
describes the evolution of the early uranium industry. Balsley paints the history of uranium 
extraction as a continuation of the pioneer’s story: small producers and prospectors, struggling 
on the edge of civilization, drew the eye of the world. For example, Balsley states that in 1899 
Marie Curie visited western Colorado to examine a uranium reduction mill built by the 
aforementioned Charles Poulot and his colleague Charles Vollique, and it was during this visit 
that she, not Friedel, bestowed the name carnotite upon the uranium and vanadium bearing ore 
there (Sullenberger, 1992, p. 4). Scholarship on the life of Marie Curie agrees that her first visit 
to the United States was in 1921, not 1899, when she received a vial of radium from President 
Warren G. Harding (New York Times, 1921). Another interesting note along these lines is the 
absence of any mention of the debate over federal control of the radium industry during 1913 and 
14. Eschewing any mention of either the federal debate or the National Radium Institute, a quasi-
public radium technology organization in Denver, Colorado, Balsley focuses on describing the 
efforts of single or groups of local miners in the discovery of million dollar deposits, and the 
their tireless effort to eke out a living in harsh conditions (Sullenberger, 1992, pp. 6-8).  
 Balsley’s romanticized past represents a strong line of sentiment amongst proponents of 
the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill Project who, drawing on the romanticized past of uranium, regard 
being a uranium miner not only as a profession, but as a part of their identity. Proponents of 
Piñon Ridge frame the uranium industry’s early history in much the same way Balsley presents 
it: a product of fringe communities struggling to get by and small industry working together to 
build a world. One excellent example of this is a statement by George Glaiser, former CEO of 
Energy Fuels and current resident of western Montrose County, who in an interview for the 




community back from its “near death state” (Stine, 2011). In this way, the romanticized nature of 
the uranium industry as typified by Balsley provides an alternative to the complex interactions 
between communities, government, and industry that brought about the radium boom and bust. 
According to this narrative, one man, with both vision and compassion for the community, can 
revitalize and reinvigorate a community through uranium development. Similarly, the uranium 
boom of the post-war era would create other “myths” of uranium development, but also provide 
physical monuments to the industry’s influence on society throughout the American West.  
Federal Uranium Industry Boom and Bust (1938 – 1970)  
 Arthur R. Gómez notes in Quest for the Golden Circle that it was the one-two punch of 
the Second World War and the Cold War that transformed the American West into the 
centerpiece of a society entirely focused on the production of materials and technologies to tap 
into the great energy unleashed by atomic fission (Gomez, 2000, p. 17). Emanating from the old 
uranium/vanadium towns of the earlier uranium boom, the impact of federally supported 
uranium exploration, extraction, and processing built the proverbial Rome of nuclear technology 
almost overnight. Millions of dollars flooded into the Four Corners region as the federal 
government, specifically the AEC, built everything from gravel roads to uranium mills, all under 
the guise of “national security.” Still, it almost did not happen, and when it did, the boom quickly 
gave way to a tortuous “stretch out” period where the federal government kept the industry it did 
much to create on a thin lifeline.  
Today, residents of western Colorado, such as Naturita Mayor Tami Lowrance, look back 
at the symbols of the “golden age of uranium”, such as the Uranium Drive-In sign, with longing 
for what they represent: growth and stability. What is lost in this symbolic frame of the uranium 




because of a conscious effort on part of the federal government to support the development of the 
industry and the region in general. Within the context of the ongoing Piñon Ridge debate, this 
reorientation of the legacy of uranium extraction within western Colorado, and the Four Corners 
region in general, is problematic, as it writes out the largest single player in the region’s 
development, and reinforces the “uranium cowboy” narrative typified by Balsley’s recollection 
of the development of the radium industry. Piñon Ridge, if built, will be subject to the greater 
forces of the global uranium market, something its geographical predecessors in western 
Colorado only experienced after decades of operation.  
Wartime Uranium and Vanadium Extraction and Processing 
 After spending the greater majority of the last two decades struggling to stay solvent, the 
beginning of World War II brought new energy to the vanadium industry in western Colorado. 
VCA, having abandoned its attempt to build a vanadium mill in Naturita around 1930, returned 
to the town to bring the mill into operation (Shumway, 1970, p. 108). As 1939 rolled into 1940 
and 41, the U.S. government began to take an active interest in vanadium, going so far as to 
classify it as a strategic material and organize a company, the Metals Reserve Company, to 
manage federal vanadium acquisition (Amundson, 2002, p. 8). In August 1942, after some four 
years of planning, the federal government organized the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) to 
develop a working weapon based on the principles of nuclear fission. Commonly known as the 
Manhattan Project, the push towards atomic energy required large amounts of uranium, uranium 
that oddly enough was piling up at the now busy vanadium mills. Army Lieutenant Philip Leahy, 
under orders from the MED’s autocratic head General Groves, came to Colorado in 1943 to 
establish a domestic stream of uranium for the project. Prior to 1943, all uranium used in the 




Port Radium in the Northwestern Territory, Canada. Working with USV’s General Manager, 
Blair Burwell, Leahy was able to acquire both a stream of uranium sludge, which was further 
processed at a facility built by the MED in Grand Junction and sent east for final refining 
(Chenoweth, 1997, p. 34). Naturita, unlike Uravan, sent its sludge material directly on to the east 
coast processing facilities, namely the Vitro Manufacturing Facility in Canonsburg, PA, the same 
facility used by Standard Chemical for producing radium three decades earlier. Of the two major 
uranium-producing towns in Montrose County during the Manhattan Project, Uravan was the 
larger, so much so that the town struggled mightily with labor shortages and petitioned for 
drafted residents to come back and work in the now fenced and guarded town, rather than waste 
their milling knowledge (Amundson, 2002, p. 10). Still, the spike was short lived, and by 1945 
the lack of interest in Colorado uranium prompted USV to return Uravan and its other operations 
to vanadium production (Shumway, 1970, pp. 164-165). USV’s exit from the uranium market 
was a signal to those who thought the uranium market might stick around after the war that 
without some type of federal support, i.e. without the government, there was no market for 
uranium.  
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Circulars  
At the conclusion of World War II, the uranium industry, completely dependent on the 
federal government collapsed (Amundson, 2002, p. 21). Production halted across the Colorado 
Plateau, and employment in the uranium-vanadium industry dropped from in the hundreds to less 
than sixty (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982, p. 4). Uravan was idled, and so little prospecting was 
occurring it is hardly worth the mention. Trapped in the lurch created by the end of the 
Manhattan Project and the battle over how to transfer the atomic weapons program out of 




With the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission on January 1, 1947, two years of 
waiting for action on the future of the uranium industry came to fruition. What the proponents of 
continued government involvement in uranium extraction got, however, was not exactly ideal. 
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1946, the founding piece of legislation that marks the birth of 
the U.S. civilian nuclear program, included two new agencies and a new set of nuclear materials 
regulations. From the AEA of 1946 a new civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was created to manage the nuclear weapons program. To oversee this agency, the AEA of 
1946 also created the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, comprised of key senators and 
representatives vital to the nuclear weapons program. More importantly for the miners and 
millers of Western Colorado, however, was the stipulation in the AEAs of 1946 regarding the 
management of “source materials”, such as uranium and thorium, and “fissionable materials”, 
such as plutonium and enriched uranium. Under the AEA of 1946, private enterprises could not 
engage in uranium mining or milling without first receiving a license from the AEC to do so, and 
even then could only sell the material to the AEC, as only the AEC could engage in the 
enrichment of uranium (Atomic Energy Commission, 1965). In essence, the federal government 
created a market environment known as a monopsony. Multiple suppliers of yellowcake or 
uranium ore could exist and operate freely, but they could only sell to the AEC, and only at 
prices the AEC determined were “just.”  
If the miners and millers of western Colorado felt the government had no faith in their 
ability to produce quality uranium for the country’s weapons program, they were right. 
Explorations conducted by Union Mines Development Corporation (UMDC), a joint USV-MED 
project, determined the total recoverable yellowcake from deposits in the United States was 




acquisitions by the federal government from foreign and domestic sources during 1947 alone 
amounted to 1,580,000  pounds (Hewlett & Duncan, 1969, p. 674). It is no wonder then, that 
David Lilienthal, the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the first Chairman of 
the AEC, expressed no confidence in the domestic uranium industry’s ability to play a significant 
part in the atomic weapons program (Gomez, 2000, p. 24). Lilienthal’s distrust in the domestic 
market was echoed in the lack of federal support for the early industry.  
After the conclusion of the war, USV and VCA stood as the only major companies 
invested in uranium development in some fashion or another. When the AEC came in to 
existence in early 1947, USV and VCA had brought the market price for uranium to such a low 
level that smaller producers lacked the scales of economy necessary to operate in the market 
(Husband, 1982, p. 18). In response, small producers in western Colorado and eastern Utah 
banded together to petition for higher prices, threatening to cut their raw ore supplies to USV and 
VCA operations if the federal government did not acquiesce to their demands (Shumway, 1970, 
p. 166). John K. Gustafson, head of the AEC’s Raw Materials Division, worked with his staff 
throughout 1947 and early 1948 to devise a scheme for incentivizing the development of a 
domestic uranium industry. The solution they came to, known today as the first three 
“circulars”—or announcements concerning additions/changes in the pricing scheme related to 
the AEC’s ore buying program—was a product of economics and international politics. 
Lilienthal and many others had little confidence in the domestic market, putting their faith in the 
Belgians’ Shinkolobwe mine for the immediate future. In turn, Gustafson could only offer 
domestic producers such incentives that would both be economical for the AEC and not 
jeopardize their contract with the Belgians (Hewlett & Duncan, 1969, p. 173). The result 




roscoelite and carnotite ores, as well as a $10,000 bonus for the first 20 short tons of ore or 
concentrate with a 20% concentration of uranium oxide (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982, p. 6).  
Gustafson knew the price was paltry, nowhere what was needed encourage the 
development of a domestic uranium industry. Even the addition of Circular 4, which provided for 
haulage and facility development expenses, could not make enough of a difference for small 
producers across the Colorado Plateau (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982, p. 6; J. H. Taylor & 
Yokell, 1979, pp. 24-25). Furthermore, the miners and millers knew it too, and disaffected with 
the lack of progress on the part of the AEC, turned up the heat, petitioning Colorado Senators 
Eugene Milliken and Edwin C. Johnson, both members of the powerful JCAE, to force the 
AEC’s hand (Shumway, 1970, p. 176). In response, the AEC issued Circular 5 in February of 
1949, which consolidated Circulars 3 and 4, increased the baseline price for uranium oxide in all 
types of ores, and bumped up the premium price for high grade ore (Albrethsen & McGinley, 
1982, p. 6). Milliken and Johnson were still not pleased though, and in the summer of that year 
they called for Lilienthal’s resignation, which, due to a variety of other reasons not associated 
with the uranium industry, they received in February of the next year (Gomez, 2000, p. 24; 
Hewlett & Duncan, 1969, p. 409). Two thousand miles away in western Colorado, the 
politicking between the JCAE Senators and Lilienthal in Washington had little bearing on the 
titanic shift occurring in the market. Finally, after decades of chaos, the uranium market had a 
stable, albeit federally supported, foundation to grow on. The first federally funded Klondike was 
underway. 
Uranium Rush 
From 1949 until 1958, the AEC’s ore buying program produced a “federally-funded 




the atomic weapons program. In 1948, the federal government purchased a paltry 230,000 
pounds of yellowcake from domestic milling operations; by 1958, that number had increased to 
over 20 million (Bruno, Dirks, Jackson, & Young, 1984, pp. B-6). National security may have 
been the reason for the boom, but that mattered little to the thousands of prospectors combing the 
American West. The discoverers of some of the largest and richest deposits of uranium in the 
United States, men such as Charlie Steen and Bob Adams, were driven by the prospect of getting 
rich, not defeating the Soviets (Amundson, 1995, p. 486; 2002, p. 19). Prospectors dreamed of 
becoming uranium millionaires, or “uraniumaires”, who would be able to do as they willed rather 
than live off beans in trailers without any basic amenities.  
As the number of people and places engaged in the uranium industry grew, a distinct 
uranium culture grew around them. This uranium culture, an inadvertent product of the federal 
government’s efforts to encourage uranium exploration, extraction, and processing, was driven 
as much by the personalities of the people who made it possible as the element itself, turned 
towns such as Grants, New Mexico, and Moab, Utah, known once for their agriculture into 
uranium capitals of the world. Everywhere towns began to see uranium-centric shops and events. 
Uranium cafes, uranium jewelry stores, uranium comic strips, Miss Uranium Pageants, and so on 
became common sights throughout the Four Corners region, as did fanciful (and hopeful) 
uranium company names such as Aladdin, Lucky Strike, King Midas, and the like (Amundson, 
2002, pp. 63, 84, 94; Husband, 1982, p. 21; Ringholz, 2002, p. 175).  
Bolstering the symbols of uranium’s rise to prominence in culture throughout the Four 
Corners region were the semi-mythical personalities of the major uraniumaires, such as the 
aforementioned Charlie Steen and Bob Adams. Of the two, Charlie Steen’s transformation from 




recounted “rags to riches” story and, while not directly dealing with events in western Colorado, 
typifies the coat of paint residents and the AEC alike threw over the federal machinery that made 
it happen. According to the various stories written about him both during his time and 
afterwards, Steen was a geologist trained at the Texas School of Mines and Metallurgy (now 
University of Texas El Paso) who, after being blacklisted from the oil industry for 
insubordination, read one day about the wealth of uranium just waiting to be found under the 
Colorado Plateau (Meyers, 1953, p. 73). At the time, most prospectors had little to no 
professional training in prospecting, and Steen, being highly qualified in this respect, determined 
he could outdo them. He packed up his family, and took them from Houston, Texas, all the way 
to the now abandoned town of Cisco, Utah where he promptly began to prospect. Except there 
was a problem: he did not have the cash to afford proper equipment. 
During Steen’s first stint in Utah, he and his family lived on little, and failed to discover 
any appreciable deposits of uranium. Furthermore, his reputation with the locals was low at best. 
Many locals thought he was a lunatic, first for bringing his family out to Utah to live in such 
squalor, and second for prospecting without a Geiger counter like any “sensible” man would. In 
1951, he made the acquaintance of Dan Hayes, another prospector who had discovered some low 
grade uranium on a piece of land between Monticello, Utah, and Moab, Utah, called Big Buck, 
and Steen asked if he could explore on the other side of the feature Hayes and his associates had 
not staked a claim on (Ringholz, 2002, p. 14). Before Steen could drill, however, he ran out of 
capital, and was forced to take a job in Tucson, Arizona so as to rebuild his cash and pay for his 
mother’s medical bills (Meyers, 1953, p. 73; Ringholz, 2002, p. 15).  
Returning to Utah a year later, Steen, in a last ditch effort with a broken down rig, drilled 




broke. Worse yet, the core samples he collected were of a greyish black material that did not 
resemble the yellow tinged rocks commonly associated with uranium in carnotite ores (Ringholz, 
2002, p. 62). It was uraninite, more commonly known as pitchblende, a uranium bearing of the 
same make as the famed Shinkbolowe mine. The uranium was a million dollar find, and Steen, 
knowing he did not have the capital to make this work by himself, invited friends who had 
helped him during his struggles, and established the Utex Exploration Company (Amundson, 
2002, p. 25; Meyers, 1953, p. 74). Mi Vida made Steen and his family wealthy beyond their 
dreams, so much so that they went from dirty prospectors to jet setting millionaires, hosting 
lavish company parties in Moab the likes of which the town had never seen and even entering 
into politics. The AEC, while hesitant to talk about the nature of the Mi Vida mine for national 
security purposes, did not dissuade journalists and talk shows from playing up Steen’s story in 
everything from NBC television productions to Time, Business Week, American Mercury, and 
True (Amundson, 2002, p. 26; Ringholz, 2002, p. 82). Steen was a national icon, a living 
monument to what uranium meant to the communities and the prospectors dotting the Four 
Corners region. Nonetheless, Steen’s fortune would not have come about if the AEC’s ore 
buying program, with its healthy bonuses for high grade ore, did not exist. This aspect of Steen’s 
story, lost in the Klondike-esque atmosphere, has painted over the material reality of government 
economic interventionism with a coat of lone prospector-made-millionaire paint.   
Utah’s uranium market, spurred on by finds such as the Mi Vida and Happy Jack mines, 
created a frenzied environment both on the ground and in the Salt Lake Stock Exchange.  The 
uranium market in western Colorado, on the other hand, grew at a quick, but not as chaotic pace. 
In Uravan, USV, now Union Carbide Nuclear (UCN) generated a more controlled boom. From 




around 1,000 people, operated 24 hours a day and seven days a week, had no need of a police 
force, and boasted some of the best schools, emergency staff, doctors, and nurses in western 
Colorado (Amundson, 2002, pp. 40-45). Naturita, by contrast, did not play a major part in the 
uranium boom. Naturita’s milling operations were always smaller than Uravan’s, and by 1958 a 
failed contract renegotiation with the AEC forced VCA to shut the mill down and shift 
operations to Durango, CO (Gomez, 2000, p. 51; Uranium Magazine, 1958b). Even so, people 
from outside of western Colorado, including Navajo miners, came to Naturita seeking work with 
VCA (Benally, 2006a, p. 16; 2006b, pp. 79-81). Uranium mining in western Colorado was a 
longstanding tradition, and with the prospect of a steady job bolstered by federal support many 
were willing to go underground for it.  
With all of the excess heavy equipment and personnel traffic on the back roads of 
western Colorado and eastern Utah, improved and even new roads were desperately needed. In 
response, the AEC petitioned for funds to improve roads throughout the key uranium-producing 
counties in the Four Corners region, and, with the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1950, received $10 million to do so (Gomez, 2000, p. 102). This money, spent on the 
development of such major rural highways as U.S. 191 in Utah and U.S. 160 in southern 
Colorado, both helped to facilitate the movement of uranium between mines and mill sites and 
replace the hundreds of miles of gravel roads (some of which still exist today) crisscrossing the 
region. After decades of irrelevancy, residents of the Colorado Plateau were finally getting the 
attention they felt they deserved. Since the start of the AEC’s ore buying program, 25 uranium 
mills, stretching from South Dakota to Texas had come online, yellowcake prices had shot from 
around $7.14 to $12.35 (around $107 today), and the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 




1982; "Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended," 2013, pp. B-4, B-6; Bruno, et al., 1984, p. 
4.13). The question was, how long would it be until that future arrived?     
Stretch Out Period 
 In 1956, the AEC announced it would extend its ore buying program until 1962, but the 
lower price of $8.00 per pound of yellowcake (Bruno, et al., 1984, p. 4.8). Even with the lower 
price, prospecting was still economically viable for many small producers, and the uranium 
industry continued to grow, breaking the mark of 10 million pounds of yellowcake produced in a 
single year in 1957 (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982, pp. B-6). Storm clouds, though, were on the 
horizon. President Dwight E. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in 1953, considered a key 
event in the development of the nuclear power industry, called for a “‘an acceptable solution’ to 
the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the 
world” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012a). Coupled with AEC Chairman Lewis 
Strauss’ total commitment to cutting back on the military budget in favor of developing a private 
nuclear industry, the AEC was reaching a crossroads concerning the development of the uranium 
industry (Balogh, 1991, pp. 112-115; Gomez, 2000, p. 52).  
Uranium industry members and their associated politicians, hopeful of the prospects 
nuclear energy offered, began to argue furiously for its adoption as a source of fuel for electricity 
generation, going so far as to claim it would supplant oil in many of its conventional uses 
(Uranium Magazine, 1955). Little discussion, however, was had over how the industry, totally 
dependent on federal programs, would survive in a free market environment. In fact, many, 
including such powerful individuals as New Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson of the JCAE, 
accused the AEC of engaging in “unnecessary secrecy” that was hindering the nuclear (and thus 




producers across the American West to continue their development plans, but as massive 
increases in ore reserves and milling capacity came to the attention of the AEC in 1957, the 
commission had to reevaluate its stance. In October of that year, Jesse C. Johnson, Director of 
the Raw Materials Division, announced at the Atomic Industrial Forum that “it no longer is in 
the interest of the Government to expand production of uranium concentrate” (Albrethsen & 
McGinley, 1982, p. 5).  
The industry was shocked. Rather than reassess their status as nothing more than an 
extension of the federal government, the uranium industry went to war with the AEC, accusing 
them of engaging in the same kind of promise-breaking as the government did when it went off 
the gold standard in 1933 (Hough, 1958). Governor McNichols of Colorado called the move “a 
national disgrace,” and Charlie Steen, now quite wealthy from his Mi Vida mine and Uranium 
Reduction Company (URECO) uranium mill, remarked that anyone who went prospecting now 
was “a damned fool” (Uranium Magazine, 1958a, 1958c). Lewis Strauss’ replacement as AEC 
Chair, John McCone, did little to improve the relationship between the AEC and the uranium 
industry. McCone, a much less abrasive man than Strauss, saw the value in developing nuclear 
technology for power generation purposes, but did not see an immediate need for the technology 
in the nation’s power mix (Balogh, 1991, p. 178). Refocusing the AEC’s operations on nuclear 
power research and development meant that a large uranium industry was unnecessary. Uranium 
would be necessary for the future power industry, but possibly not for another decade or so. In 
response to this quandary, the AEC complicated an already messy situation by adding on to 
Johnson’s 1957 statement that as of November 24, 1958, the AEC would only purchase 
yellowcake from producers with outstanding contracts with the AEC (Albrethsen & McGinley, 




bust. Known as the “stretch out” program, the AEC allowed producers to defer part of their 
contracts to 1962 - 1966 (later modified to 1970) at a constant $8.00-per-pound rate (Albrethsen 
& McGinley, 1982; Amundson, 2002, pp. 108-109).  
To prevent the uranium market from completely collapsing, the federal government 
imposed an embargo on all foreign uranium in 1959, with the exception of preexisting contracts, 
which were subsequently terminated in 1968 (J. H. Taylor & Yokell, 1979, pp. 28, 33). In 
addition to the embargo, the federal government also passed the “Private Ownership of Special 
Nuclear Materials Act” in 1964 that allowed private utilities to purchase yellowcake directly 
from milling companies and have the AEC enrich it for them on a toll basis (Amundson, 2002, p. 
109; J. H. Taylor & Yokell, 1979, p. 33). Nonetheless, the independent producer of the federal 
boom was gone. During the 1960s, smaller producers, once common throughout the Four 
Corners region, would give way to large energy and mining conglomerates such as Rio Algom, 
Getty and Gulf Oil, Kerr-McGee, and Anaconda (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982, pp. B-4; J. H. 
Taylor & Yokell, 1979, p. 37).  
In this respect, western Colorado, with only Uravan in operation, was shielded to a 
certain extent. As a part of Union Carbide, Uravan had always existed in the big conglomerate 
world, and unlike many mills across the American West, never changed hands. This isn’t to say 
that Uravan was protected from the rapid drop in uranium demand; during the 1960s, the 
population of Uravan dropped from around 2,000 to around 850, as mill operations turned from 
rapid production to process improvement (Amundson, 2002, p. 119). Uravan though, still had the 
best schools, doctors, and public facilities in the region, and most of all a large parent company 
to keep it functioning until market conditions improved. In this respect, it is easy to see why 




bust, but it, like the greater uranium business, needed the lifeline of an economically mightier 
entity to keep it afloat. While theorizing on the part Union Carbide played in keeping Uravan 
functioning is beyond the scope of this study, another uranium company town, Jeffrey City, 
provides an interesting comparison. Though Western Nuclear’s Jeffrey City was much younger 
than Uravan, it too went through the tortuous path of the stretch out period. However, unlike 
Uravan, the lack of a strong backer created a situation where the company started to bleed 
money, so much so that by the end of the AEC’s stretch out period in 1970, Western Nuclear 
sold a minority interest to the significantly larger Phelps-Dodge (Amundson, 1995, p. 492).  
Community and industry stability aside, both Uravan and Jeffrey City could not have 
survived the period without the AEC’s stretch out program. For all the stories of self-made men 
and monuments to the golden idol of uranium, the reality is that none of the uranium towns 
throughout the American West could have grown, developed, or sustained themselves through 
the bust, without the help of the AEC. The acrid response of uranium miners and millers to the 
federal government’s change in procurement policy during 1958 is understandable, but it 
highlights their inability or unwillingness to acknowledge how much they depended upon federal 
dollars. From roads to mills, the uranium capitals of the world were the implicit property of the 
federal government, and in turn subject to the natural political flows of Washington. In the 
context of the current debate over Piñon Ridge, the lack of comprehension for what part the 
federal government played, for good or ill, in bringing the uranium communities about, creates 
an environment where individuals who support the mill will also criticize the government for 
bringing about the demise of “their” communities. By promoting the “Steenified” version of the 
federal boom, proponents of Piñon can treat the history of uranium mining and milling in 




starting with the radium boom and continuing on through the commercial boom and bust of the 
1970s and 80s. In reality, though, even the supposed “free market” of the commercial boom and 
bust of the 1970s and 80s was brought about by federal policies, albeit in an indirect manner.  
Commercial Boom and Bust (1971 – 1984)  
 If personalities and federal dollars drove the federal uranium boom of the 1950s, federal 
intervention, primarily in the form of the uranium embargo and a shift in enrichment policies, 
drove the commercial boom of the 1970s. Gone were the symbols of uranium’s glorious rise; the 
bust of the 60s had taken care of them, at least for a while. Gone were the uranium industry 
titans; Steen’s life was in a tailspin that would leave him seriously injured from a prospecting 
accident and nearly destitute from a IRS raid, while Bob Adams was forced in 1973 to sell 
Western Nuclear to Phelps-Dodge (Amundson, 1995, p. 493; Ringholz, 2002, pp. 219-235). 
Replacing these icons of the federal boom was the cold, calculating planning of major energy 
firms such as Getty, Gulf, Conoco, and Exxon, all of which had the capital to stay in the uranium 
business, but none of the cultural connections common amongst the older companies such as 
Western Nuclear, Utex, and even Union Carbide.  
For residents of western Colorado, the influence of larger players on the uranium market 
mattered little. UCN was the only major player in the region, and had been for the better part of a 
decade. The one major difference for western Coloradans that other uranium communities would 
struggle with later was the issue of ecological and radiological damage, specifically tailings 
generated from milling, that were beginning to become a serious concern. By 1970, Uravan had 
operated in some fashion or another for the better part of 40 years, significantly longer than any 
other milling operation in the nation. Uravan, along with former uranium milling towns such as 




environmental and radiological issues stemming from tailings and who exactly would pay for it 
all. These new environmental and health costs, brought about by the passage of the multitude of 
environmental acts such as the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the Clean Water 
and Clean Air Acts, and the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), as well 
as the general shift towards environmental protection added a new dimension to the debate over 
uranium mining and milling in the American West. On the ground, residents fought vehemently 
against the regulations, claiming that uranium mining and milling were safe (Amundson, 2002, 
p. 151).  
The ever present battle over the legacy of uranium during this decade tends, as it did for 
residents of western Colorado during the commercial boom and bust, to focus on the relationship 
between federal health and environmental policies and the degradation of the uranium industry. 
This relationship, only intensified by the fact that uranium prices began a rapid descent right 
after the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, fails to capture how volatile the 
commercial boom was. In the context of Piñon Ridge, the lack of a wider-angled perspective on 
why the domestic uranium industry failed to survive at mid-1970s production levels means that 
both proponents and opponents of the uranium mill argue over only a segment of the issues that 
brought about the industry’s collapse. Key non-environmental/health policy factors that drove 
the commercial boom and bust, specifically federal enrichment policy, the uranium embargo, and 
a little known uranium cartel, show that while the added costs of ecological and health 
regulations upon producers did add an unwanted burden, the nature of the domestic market itself 




Playing with Fire: AEC, ERDA, and DOE Uranium Market Intervention 
 With the termination of the AEC’s stretch out program on December 31, 1970, the 
uranium industry could no longer rely on its primary purchaser and had to face the proverbial 
music as to whether it, and the nuclear power industry in general, could survive (Albrethsen & 
McGinley, 1982, p. 5). The federal monopsony had provided communities throughout the 
American West with the means to develop and modernize, and despite the pains associated with 
the stretch out period of the 1960s, left them intact. The uranium industry of the late 1960s and 
1970s though, was not the uranium industry of the 50s. Long gone were the small independent 
uranium producers, the doghole miners, and the Charlie Steens of the world. By 1970, around 
50% of the high grade ore bodies, and many of the 14 uranium mills in operation, were in the 
hands of large “energy” – i.e. oil companies, such as Getty, Gulf, Conoco, and Exxon 
(Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982; Amundson, 2002, p. 136). These companies, much like Union 
Carbide during the stretch out period, had the capital and the economies of scale necessary to 
survive in a uranium market where prices had dropped to less than $6.00 per pound of 
yellowcake by 1970.  
 The federal government’s role in the uranium market was changing too. While residents 
of the uranium communities dotting the American West may have fallen under the 
misconception that they were the industry of interest, the AEC was only ever interested in 
maintaining that industry to ensure a supply of uranium for the nuclear power industry’s 
projected uranium demand. During the late 1960s and early 70s, utilities placed over 100 orders 
for nuclear reactors, and brought online over 20, the majority of which were rated to produce in 
the range of 500 to 1000MW of electricity (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012b; J. H. 




incestuous system arose where utilities would purchase yellowcake from corporations that would 
also provide reactor technology. Large nuclear technology companies, chiefly Westinghouse and 
General Electric, began in the late 1960s to offer packages where they would agree to supply 
uranium for reactors utilities had as of yet not built, irrelevant of the reactor design (J. H. Taylor 
& Yokell, 1979, p. 119). Since acquiring foreign uranium was out of the question, a utility 
interested in building a nuclear reactor first had to determine what kind to build, order up the 
necessary yellowcake for it, and then pay the government to enrich it. To increase the complexity 
of the situation, in May 1973, the AEC restructured their enrichment services, mandating a 
“fixed commitment contracts” system where utilities were forced to purchase yellowcake years 
in advance of the actual need (Amundson, 2002, pp. 137-138). The new system allowed the AEC 
to plan, but meant that all of the other participants in the nuclear fuel cycle were tied together. If 
one pulled out, they would all feel the pain. 
The Uranium Cartel 
 On the international front, the impact of the foreign uranium embargo was causing whole 
uranium industries to collapse. By 1970, the lack of an American market for export caused the 
Australians to discontinue uranium production altogether, the South Africans to stockpile 
uranium bearing tailings from gold mines in hopes of better market conditions, and the Canadian 
industry to contract to one sixth of its size in 1959 (Radetzki, 1981, pp. 44-45). Pressure from 
domestic utilities in the U.S. forced the hand of the federal government, and in 1974 a plan was 
put into place to gradually relax the embargo over the 1977-1984 time period (Amundson, 1995, 
p. 494). By this time, though, foreign uranium producers had already begun to seek a solution for 
themselves. While no one will dispute the greater importance of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) role in shaping energy issues in the late 20
th




was not the only cartel to form during this time. Spurred on by the need to protect their 
industries, the major non-American uranium producers, Canada, Australia, South Africa 
(including Namibia), and France agreed to work together to form a cartel and fix uranium prices 
in their favor (J. H. Taylor & Yokell, 1979, pp. 66-67). Some of the major corporations engaged 
in the cartel included large foreign producers such as Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), Imetal, and Denison 
Mines as well as American energy conglomerates such as Gulf and Getty Oil, owners of some 
12% of domestic uranium reserves. With a few countries producing the majority of uranium, 
collusion amongst members was easy enough, though the cartel did not have a significant impact 
upon the overall uranium market until some two years after (Radetzki, 1981, p. 108). By the time 
it did though, prices were already on the rise, as reactor orders continued at a healthy pace 
despite the economic downturn brought on by the oil crisis, and the cartel’s price fixing only 
amplified the quick pace at which prices rose. In theory, the cartel was trying to develop a 
sustainable uranium market for its members, but the combination of the cartel and U.S. AEC 
(later ERDA and DOE) enrichment policies created a powder keg situation where the hope of the 
domestic uranium industry for the long awaited second boom ignited a rapid and unwarranted 
rate of development.  
Boom and Bust 
 The combination of reactor orders, federal enrichment policy, faith in the idea that 
nuclear power had finally come to fruition, and the cartel caused a massive upswing in 
yellowcake prices. From 1972 until its peak in 1976, the spot market price of yellowcake 
increased almost five-fold to a nominal price of $43.23 per pound of yellowcake while 
production oscillated between 23 and 27 million pounds per year (Bruno, et al., 1984). This 




fuel to some two dozen utilities in the U.S., to back out of its commitments in September of 
1975, or risk a paying for yellowcake that was worth more than its shareholders’ equity 
(Amundson, 2002, pp. 139-140). The nature of the fixed contracts system employed by the 
ERDA (the AEC was dissolved in January of that year) meant that as prices rose at an 
exponential rate, Westinghouse could not adjust accordingly. To make matters worse, in summer 
of 1976, Friends of the Earth, an environmental group in Australia, stole files from Mary 
Kathleen Uranium, a subsidiary of RTZ, that documented what many in the uranium industry 
had feared, a cartel (J. H. Taylor & Yokell, 1979). Coupled with the massive drop in reactor 
orders from 26 in 1974 to 4 in 1975, the uranium industry powder keg went. Prices for uranium 
dropped slightly in 1977, but began to descend in 1978. The incident at the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania only exacerbated the situation, causing 
already hesitant utilities to cancel their orders for new reactors (Watts, 2012, p. 4). The uranium 
market was in a free fall; as shown in figure 3.1, prices for uranium dropped 50% by 1982, and 
continued on a generally downward trajectory throughout the 1980s and early 90s (Bruno, et al., 
1984, p. 4.24; Energy Information Administration, 1993, p. 16).  
 
Figure 3.1. AEC and Spot Market Yellowcake Prices, 1948-2012. 





 After 1980, the industry would never be the same. Construction throughout the uranium 
industry came to a halt as the domestic market disappeared. In western Colorado, Uravan, now 
unable to stay afloat in the market and burdened with the cost of dealing with nearly 50 years of 
continuous uranium and vanadium milling, started to shut up shop (Amundson, 2002, p. 151). By 
1984, Union Carbide Umetco closed the mill (Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). The 
town continued to exist for a little while after, but as the site turned from a former milling town 
to a EPA Superfund Site, all residents were ordered to leave no later than December 31, 1986 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Uravan went up as a ramshackle mining town brought 
on by the search for a material, radium, that promised health benefits derived from radiation. It 
came down because of the potential damage the same material could do.   
Piñon Ridge, White Mesa, and the Legacy of Bob Adams 
 The 1980s brought little for residents of the uranium communities of the American West 
to smile about. One of the few bright spots was the completion of Energy Fuels Nuclear’s White 
Mesa Mill in Blanding, Utah (Energy Fuels Nuclear, 1980). Energy Fuels Nuclear (not the 
current Energy Fuels) was a relatively new uranium firm, even if its owner was not. Bob Adams, 
after heading the Phelps-Dodge owned Western Nuclear for a few years, left the company, and in 
1974 gathered some former Western Nuclear people to join him in the creation of a new uranium 
mining and milling company, Energy Fuels Nuclear (Amundson, 1995, p. 493). Energy Fuels 
Nuclear, like Western Nuclear and many other uranium companies throughout the American 
West, felt slighted by the lack of support on the part of the federal government for their industry. 
They interpreted the language of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, specifically section 161(v) of 
the 1982 version, to include a commitment on the part of the DOE to restrict the enrichment of 




Western Nuclear, in conjunction with Energy Fuels Nuclear and Uranium Resources Inc., sued 
the DOE and 22 electricity utilities, winning in the lower courts before having the ruling 
overturned by the Supreme Court in June of 1988 (Amundson, 1995; Griffin & Dorin, 1989, pp. 
433-434; Payne, 1989, pp. 502-503). The uranium industry, once a virtual protectorate of the 
federal government, was all alone.  
The Huffman v. Western Nuclear ruling brought about the end of Western Nuclear, and 
left Energy Fuels Nuclear very much alone in the world of uranium producers. Energy Fuels 
Nuclear eventually could not survive on its own, and after the death of Bob Adams, was 
absorbed into International Uranium Corporation (IUC), which later bought out Denison Mines 
and took its name (Dension Mines, 2012; Ringholz, 2002, p. 318). Among the executives to 
leave the uranium business after the end of Energy Fuels Nuclear was George Glaiser, founder of 
the current incarnation of Energy Fuels, and Stephen P. Antony, Energy Fuels’ current President 
and CEO (Energy Fuels, 2012a). So much was Glaiser and the other executives’ respect for the 
legacy of Bob Adams and the uranium capital of the world he built in Wyoming that they named 
Energy Fuels after Adams’ Energy Fuels Nuclear (Stine, 2011). It is fitting then, that in June of 
2012 Energy Fuels came to an agreement with Denison Mines, the literal descendent of Energy 

















 Spanning over a five-year period, the debate over Piñon Ridge continues, as proponents 
and opponents of the mill argue over the validity of wildlife reports, air particulate models, and 
other such large-scale environmental modeling and analysis required by federal and state law. In 
this space, the major questions focus not on how community residents perceive the validity of 
particular models or projections, but whether or not the models and projections meet the 
necessary technical rigor for a study of such local and regional magnitude. All the while, 
proponents and opponents alike continue to discuss whether the mill is the best solution for 
communities of the western, or West End, of Montrose County. Here, the words of proponents 
and opponents are as important, if not more so, than the numbers they use to back them up.  
Using Kinsella’s bounded constitutive model of communication as a phenomenological 
framework for examining how the physical aspect of the uranium industry, the uranium mines, 
mills, and ore, relate to the symbolic representations community members imbue themselves and 
the uranium mill with, this chapter examines how community members see both the past and 
future of the uranium industry in the West End. Examining statements made by proponents 
during the 2010 meetings and 2012 hearings through this model elucidates an interesting 
concept: the idea of uranium milling as community. For proponents of Piñon Ridge, the uranium 
mill and the community jointly constitute each other, and thus generate care, or sorge, for each 
other. In this relationship, the uranium mill becomes a “caretaker” of the community, providing 
steady employment with good wages, services, and opportunities for future generations to 




the case of Piñon Ridge to bring the industry back to the region. While this relationship seems 
mutually beneficial, both parties must also bind, or enframe themselves, to the notions of the 
other. In the case of the uranium mill, uranium milling as community forces the uranium mill, 
and consequently the operators of it, to work within the community’s notion of the uranium mill 
being more than an industrial operation. Conversely, as the uranium mill is enframed by the 
community, the uranium mill enframes the community, binding it to the boom and bust cycles 
inherent to all extractive industries, as well as the deep federal and state involvement in all 
operations related to the nuclear fuel cycle.  
This relationship, while seemingly economic in nature, is the product of more than 
economics; it is the consequence of a community, which has over a century long relationship 
with uranium mining and milling developed a sense of communion with the uranium mill, a 
“deep time” connection that transcends both the materiality of the present and past. 
Understanding this relationship, and what consequences it has for the greater debate over Piñon 
Ridge, is important for both the uranium industry and the community to move forwards into the 
21
st
 century.  
This chapter is broken down into three parts: policy and Piñon Ridge post 2010; 
methodology; and analysis. In part one, I will examine the events surrounding the Piñon Ridge 
public engagement process after the 2010 meetings, paying particular attention to the conflict 
between federal and state agencies over who has final authority in the licensing process. Next, I 
will outline the methodology used in this study. Finally, I will apply Kinsella’s model and 
examine the transcripts from the 2010 and 2012 meetings, focusing on what I call the sorge-




Politics, Policy, and Piñon Ridge after 2010 
If the public engagement process surrounding the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill licensing 
process—fraught as it was by the failure of the Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment (CDPHE) to adhere to hearing procedure, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s involvement—was dysfunctional, then the polices underpinning their actions 
should take some of the blame. While the nature of the public engagement process associated 
with the licensing of uranium and thorium processing facilities in the State of Colorado was clear 
enough, the question as to who had the right to intercede should the process fail to meet the letter 
of the law was not.    
Strictly speaking, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) does not have authority to 
involve itself in a state matter; however, comments made by NRC staff during 2012 highlighted 
a flaw in the public engagement processes associated with the Piñon Ridge licensing process: the 
failure by CDPHE to carry out a public hearing as per state law. Complicating this situation 
further was the fact that this particular comment correlated with one of many complaints the 
Telluride-based environmental group, the Sheep Mountain Alliance (SMA), was in the process 
of suing the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) over. Below, I 
will examine the laws and regulations concerning public engagement in the licensing of a 
uranium mill in Colorado, as well as the legal structure that pertains to how the state and NRC 
share power and oversight as it pertains to the mill licensing process. From there, I will examine 
the public engagement process surrounding Piñon Ridge after the conclusion of the 2010 
meetings, the consequent lawsuit, and the court decision to require a correct public hearing as per 
state and federal law. Examining the legal and policy battles associated with the genesis of the 




government share the policy and regulation space associated with uranium milling, but sets the 
stage for my conclusions in Chapter 5.  
Public Engagement and the Agreement States Program 
In the original form of the 1968 agreement between the State of Colorado and the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), there was no mention of the need for including the public in the 
license evaluation process. Public engagement as it comes about in the licensing process of 
Piñon Ridge is the product of the following legal rules and regulations: the Uranium Mill 
Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA); the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (AEA); the State of Colorado Radiation Control Act (RCA); and the Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) Licensing Requirements for Uranium 
and Thorium Processing ("Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended," 2013; "Radiation Control 
Act," 2012; "Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Radiation Control:  Licensing Requirements 
for Uranium and Thorium Proessing," 2011; "Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act," 
1978). Prior to UMTRCA, uranium mill tailings were not considered a major health and 
environmental concern (see Mogren, 2002, for a more complete discussion of this topic). 
However, after UMTRCA, the AEA of 1954 (from here on abbreviated as AEA) was amended to 
include byproduct material licensing as part of the NRC’s licensing purview. Similarly, Section 
274 of the AEA, the section concerned with the “Agreement States Program”—the legal 
framework for how states and the NRC can share licensing and regulatory authority associated 
with specific nuclear materials—was altered to address the new byproduct licensing 
requirements as per UMTRCA. Section 274(o) then required all states to include a space for 
public involvement in the form of a public hearing and a public comment period. This stipulation 




required compliance with the new parts of Section 274. In response, Colorado enacted the 
Radiation Control Act (RCA), which required not one, but two public meetings; one being a 
hearing pursuant to section 274, as well as appropriate state laws concerning hearings (24-4-104, 
Colorado Revised Statues (C.R.S.) or 24-4-105, C.R.S.), and the other being a public meeting. 
The CDPHE, who, as the state counterpart agency to the NRC, was responsible for making sure 
these changes occurred in the licensing process, including making sure the public hearing 
adhered to state law.  
 The stipulation as to what the CDPHE was responsible for was clear enough; however, 
the question as to who could step in should the CDPHE fail to fulfill its obligations was not. In 
the agreement between the State of Colorado and the NRC, the NRC retains the right to, after 
reasonable notice, terminate or suspend the agreement should the state fail to meet all of the 
requirements in section 274 of the AEA (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982). The NRC also 
maintains the right to periodically evaluate the quality of the regulatory programs in “Agreement 
States” through the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Process (IMPEP). Managed by 
the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Program (FSME), the 
NRC examines all Agreement States regulations on a regular basis, but conducts an IMPEP 
review and associated CDPHE-NRC meeting on a roughly biennial cycle (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2013). The CDPHE and NRC conducted the most recent of these IMPEP periodic 
meetings on April 17, 2012, even as the lawsuit over Piñon Ridge was still in Denver District 
Court. Despite the collegial nature of the letter sent by Randy Erikson, the NRC’s Regional 
States Agreement Officer, only a month earlier the two organizations were in a row over a letter 
sent by the NRC in response to a complaint made by one of the major opponents of the Piñon 




Piñon Ridge Legal Battle and New Hearing 
 At the conclusion of the 2010 meetings on the Piñon Ridge license, opponents of the mill, 
in particular the Sheep Mountain Alliance, the Energy Minerals Law Center, and the Western 
Mining Action Project, disagreed with both the content of Energy Fuels’ license and the way 
CDPHE carried out the legally mandated public engagement. Consequently, the SMA filed a 
complaint in Denver District Court on February 4, 2011, alleging the aforementioned flaws in the 
regulatory process, and disputing the CDPHE’s issuance of a preliminary radioactive materials 
license to Energy Fuels on January 5
th
 (Huffington Post, 2011). Despite this lawsuit, the CDPHE 
continued to move forwards with its license evaluation, and on March 7
th
 issued a final 
radioactive materials license for Piñon Ridge (Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment, 2011). 
In response, Jeffrey Parsons of the Western Mining Action Project filed a statement of 
concern with the FSME, speaking to their staff on March 10
th
 of that year (Jackson, 2012). After 
a year of evaluation, the NRC’s final response to the issues raised by Parsons substantiated at 
least one concern: the CDPHE had failed to provide an opportunity for a public hearing during 
the licensing process (Jackson, 2012). Approximately a week later, the SMA issued a press 
release, claiming the NRC agreed that the CDPHE had not met federal standards for the licensing 
of uranium mills (Sheep Mountain Alliance, 2012). There was one catch: the NRC had already 
contacted the CDPHE about the issue, conferring with them about the status of the CDPHE’s 
licensing program (Henderson, Feburary 27, 2012).  
Still, the damage was done; the dispute between the NRC and CDPHE, up to this point 
behind-closed-doors, was now open to public inquiry. Denver Post writer Bruce Finley wrote a 
piece about the letter and subsequent press release on March 15
th




saw the process as “botched” and noting that Steve Tarlton, head of the CDPHE division 
responsible for uranium mill licensing, had sent a response letter to the NRC disputing the claims 
in their letter (Finley, 2012b). The CDPHE had to respond officially to the NRC’s claims. On the 
next day, Christopher Urbina, Executive Director of the CDPHE, wrote back to the FSME office, 
arguing that the NRC had no right to not include the CDPHE in on their communications with 
Jeffrey Parsons and, most importantly, that the CDPHE and/or the NRC had never agreed on 
“corrective actions” concerning the “flaws” in the public engagement process (Urbina, March 16, 
2012).  
Both agencies, needing to quell this situation before it got further out of hand, returned to 
private discussions, with Mark Satorius, head of FSME, sending Urbina a letter clarifying the 
NRC’s statements and wish to stay out of the ongoing SMA v. CDPHE litigation (Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment, 2012b; Satorius, April 4, 2012). In addition, the 
NRC came out the next week stating it would let the Colorado legal system sort out the issues 
surrounding the Piñon Ridge license, though they still refused to back down from their position 
concerning the impropriety  of the process under which Energy Fuels received a radioactive 
materials license (Finley, 2012a).  
The NRC’s unwavering conclusion that the CDPHE did not follow the letter of the law 
concerning public engagement in the licensing process virtually ensured SMA and the other 
opponents of the mill that the court would substantiate at least one of their assertions. On June 
13, Judge McMullen ruled that in the case of the public hearings as provided for in the Radiation 
Control Act and executed through the corresponding state regulation (6 CCR 1007-1 Part 18), 
the CDPHE failed to provide an opportunity for a hearing ("Sheep Mountain Alliance v. 




to convene a hearing in accordance with regulations, and to come to a decision on the application 
within 270 days of his court ruling. As per stipulations, the CDPHE announced on August 7
th 
that 
there would be a hearing to convene on October 7
th
 and then be held in its entirety from 
November 7
th
 through the 13
th
 (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 2012a). 
This set of hearings, would be presided over not by a current judge, but a former one, Dick Dana, 
who in his capacity as hearing officer, was there to ensure the 2012 hearing met state laws and 
McMullen’s judicial order. 
Piñon Ridge Today 
 At the conclusion of the 2012 hearings on November 13
th
, Judge Dana had a 30-day 
window once all proposed findings and conclusions were in from the various parties to the 
hearing to issue his final decision concerning the information presented at the hearing and the 
future course of action. Issued on January 14, 2013, Judge Dana confirmed that the hearing met 
all stipulations of the law as per RCA and that the CDPHE should consider new information 
presented by all of the parties to the process in their license evaluation (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Ruling, 2013). However, on January 25
th
 the Sheep Mountain Alliance, 
along with the Western Mining Action Project and Rocky Mountain Wild filed an appeal, stating 
the CDPHE had no other option but to block the mill license (Sackett, 2013). This appeal was 
denied by Urbina on February 28
th
, though with the understanding that all new information 
presented during the 2012 hearing would become part of the CDPHE’s evaluation process 
(Urbina, 2013) 
Nonetheless, clearing this hurdle by no means ensures that if the license is approved 
Energy Fuels will build the mill. As Judge Dana noted during the 2012, hearing, the likeliness of 




the mill still have the opportunity to appeal to the Denver District Court after the CDPHE makes 
its decision in April (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, Volume VI, 2012, pp. 1170-1171). Given 
the inability of both the regulatory and the legal processes to resolve the issues surrounding 
Piñon Ridge, a close examination of proponents’ argumentation serves both to expand the greater 
body of scholarship on issues in the New Nuclear West, as well as address how the current 
public engagement processes surrounding uranium mill licensing could be altered to better serve 
the public.  
Methodology 
 My analysis of the statements made by proponents of the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill 
project concerning the socioeconomic advantages of approving the mill will utilize William 
Kinsella’s bounded constitutive model of communication as a phenomenological analytical 
framework. Phenomenological studies of communication, such as Kinsella’s bounded 
constitutive model, seek to orient human action in both time and space in such a way that makes 
the mundane unique and meaningful (Lindof & Taylor, 2002, pp. 34-35). By orienting 
experiences in time and space, scholars can examine human experiences both in terms of 
personal experiences and culturally predominant “myths, frames, scripts, and common sense” 
(Lindof & Taylor, 2002, p. 35). Such an approach is aptly suited to addressing the argumentation 
of proponents of Piñon Ridge, as many actively identify with the entire length of uranium 
extraction and processing in western Colorado. Furthermore, phenomenological studies, by their 
very nature, seek to unpack the essence of lived experiences and, in the case of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, grapple with the relationship between humans and the material world. For those 
who support Piñon Ridge, the “world” includes the more than one-hundred years of active 




necessitate a holistic approach towards organizing statements made in favor of the mill that 
simultaneously address the material and symbolic aspects of uranium milling in western 
Colorado.  
 To accomplish this, my analysis draws from the three aforementioned public 
meetings/hearings in 2010 and 2012. Since the two meetings and the hearing followed 
significantly different formats, I will provide a brief explanation of the structure of the two 
public engagement formats. In 2010, the Judge Richard Brown, a retired Montrose District Court 
judge, served as moderator for the meetings in Nucla and Montrose. At the beginning of both 
meetings, Judge Brown introduced himself, any of the ancillary people not directly associated 
with CDPHE with him, the Court Reporter, Keith Rusk, who was responsible for transcribing the 
comments of members of the public, Steve Tarlton, and Energy Fuels’ Frank Filas. After 
Brown’s introduction, both Tarlton and Filas conducted small, 15-20 minute presentations, 
outlining the licensing process and the Piñon Ridge mill, respectively. At the conclusion of these 
presentations, Judge Brown commenced the public comments period, allotting each speaker 3 
minutes as per the speaker protocol distributed at the meetings (Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment, 2010). In the case of a few members of the public who had documents 
to present with their comments, Judge Brown directed them to hand these over to Tarlton so they 
could become part of the record for their comments. Beyond these two points, Judge Brown only 
broke the public comments up to provide periodic breaks for Rusk, or to direct specific speakers 
to wrap their statements up.  
By contrast, the public comments made during the 2012 hearing occurred at pre-specified 
intervals during the multi-day hearing process. During the pre-hearing process, the parties 








) and at 8:30am on November 12
th
. All members 
of the public present who were not already party to the hearing were directed by Judge Dana to 
sign in and submit any written documentation they had to support their comments. Each speaker 
was sworn in, and given what appears to be an unlimited amount of time to speak, as evidenced 
by the lack of timekeeping on the part of Judge Dana. In addition, unlike during the 2010 
meetings, the parties and their respective legal staff could ask each member of the public 
clarification questions, though by and large few parties did during the various commenting 
sessions.  The former of these two  changes significantly influenced the size and scope of 
statements made by both opponents and proponents of the mill, with the comments of some 
extending for multiple pages of the transcripts. Because of the lengthy nature of these statements, 
I employ a grounded theory coding approach as per Glaser and Strauss (1967), which has both 
the advantage of being widely used in the social sciences and the humanities and a level of 
mutability necessary to deal with the interwoven nature of statements made by proponents of 
Piñon Ridge.  
 Collecting all of the statements made by the public during the course of the two meetings 
in 2010 and the hearing in 2012, I first categorized speakers based on their stance for, against, or 
neutral, towards the mill. From here, I noted who the proponents were and on what days during 
the meetings/hearing the provided public comment. Of the 140 persons who provided comment 
during the entirety of the public engagement process surrounding Piñon Ridge, 64 spoke in favor 
of the mill, with only ten of those coming from the 2012 hearing.  Three of the 64 spoke at 
hearings in both 2010 and 2012. I categorized statements made by proponents of the mill into 
two broad categories:  environmental/health issues associated with the project, and 




Focusing on the latter of these groups, I coded statements by the proponents based on 
whether they discussed one of the following: community stability, economic stability, technical 
expertise, self-sufficiency, Colorado culture, and technical/economic information supporting the 
mill. While scholars in nuclear and environmental communication have examined issues in the 
New Nuclear West from the viewpoint of proponents (e.g.,Clarke, 2010; Morgan, 2008; Peeples, 
et al., 2008), none of yet have explicitly examined the socioeconomic issues surrounding these 
sites. Given the importance of the uranium industry to the West End, in particular as a major 
source of employment for residents, I contend that any discussion of the Piñon Ridge debate is 
incomplete without a close examination of how proponents see Piñon Ridge fitting into the 
greater material and symbolic landscape that gives their world meaning. Furthermore, as Clarke 
(2010) conclusion implies, ignoring the social and economic aspects of a particular project in 
favor of the more acceptable health and environmental arguments fails to capture the full 
spectrum of narratives surrounding the intersection of a community, a siting controversy, and the 
material world.  
 After I coded the data as per the categories above, I applied the bounded constitutive 
model’s phenomenological framework to the statements, organizing them based on their 
thematic focus on either the material (uranium mining, milling, or the metal itself) or the 
symbolic (local community, regional community, personal identification) aspects of the issue at 
hand. Rather than applying a broad “material” and “symbolic” categorization as in Clarke 
(2010), I combined the material and symbolic aspects of the argumentation employed by 
proponents into two overarching themes: uranium milling as community, uranium milling as past 
and future. Each of these major themes can then be broken down through the public comments 




and as expertise. Figure 4.1 below provides a diagram explaining the process I used to code and 
then apply the bounded constitutive model to the statements made by proponents of Piñon Ridge. 
Darker lines indicate when the information separated in the previous organization of the data was 
reorganized to reflect the either the nature of the bounded constitutive model or the key themes 
and sub-themes within the data.    
 
Figure 4.1. Process for Coding and Organizing Piñon Ridge Proponents’ Statements. 
The  approach outlined above  is in line with commonly held practices in qualitative 
communication studies, as it prevents the coding from superseding the interpretation (Lindof & 
Taylor, 2002, p. 222). In addition, this approach gives me the space necessary to address themes 
in a way that is meaningful for the purposes of evaluating the public engagement process. 
 Uranium Mining and Milling as Community 
 For proponents of Piñon Ridge, and especially those who live in the West End of 
Montrose County, it is clear that uranium milling is not simply a source of employment for 
residents; it is also synonymous with community. In this way, the uranium mill, either in the 
form of previous milling towns such as Uravan or the proposed Piñon Ridge Mill, took on 
human-like characteristics, as proponents endowed them with the ability to bring both family and 




Turning the notion of sorge on its head, the uranium mill itself becomes a caretaker of the 
people, a material shepherd of the communities of western Montrose County (colloquially 
known as the “West End”) “flock.” 
 Even so, this relationship is a product of half-truths; while proponents may personify the 
uranium mill as a community protector, they also profess the technical expertise necessary to 
grapple with the challenges posed by working with uranium and, combined with preconceived 
notions of socioeconomic development, harbor certain expectations for any development 
projects. These notions of socioeconomic development are part of an overarching fatalist 
worldview that includes assertions that (1) boom and bust economics common throughout all 
extractive industries are a fundamental part of life in the West End, and (2) uranium extraction is 
the only viable option for development in the region. Thus, uranium, and in turn the uranium 
mill, are enframed as being not only within the grasp of human control, but capable of serving 
human needs in terms of providing a steady income for residents of the economically depressed 
West End.  
These assertions run counter to the history of the uranium industry in the West End and 
the Nuclear West in general, and generate what I term a sorge-enframing duality between the 
community and the mill. In this duality, both the community and the uranium mill are bound in a 
relationship that places disproportionate burdens on each other, creating an unstable environment 
for healthy socioeconomic development. Below, I will examine each of three major categories—
family, fatalism and expertise—as they play out in the public comments made by proponents, 
applying the bounded constitutive model for analysis, and examining the influence (or lack 
thereof) of historical data concerning socioeconomic development related to uranium mining and 




overarching themes developed during my analysis to address how proponents see the future of 
Piñon Ridge within the context of the greater continuum of uranium mining and milling history 
in the region and the nuclear industry in general. Quotes presented in the succeeding analysis are 
emblematic of the greater themes identified during my analysis, and in this way serve to 
elucidate the rhetorical methods employed in proponents’ argumentation and how these methods 
relate to the greater relationship between the material and the symbolic.   
Uranium Mining and Milling as Family 
 “What we want, we want our kids to come home. We want our friends to come back” 
(Transcript of Public Comments #1, 2010, pp. 49-50). Statements like this from West Ender 
Doylene Garvey exemplify the sentiment shared by many of the proponents of Piñon Ridge. 
With unemployment hovering around 13% in Montrose County in early 2010, and over twenty 
years separating the closure of Uravan to the present day, the prospect of steady jobs for a multi-
decadal period shifts the nature of the uranium mill away from being simply an industrial project 
to provider for the community (Colorado Department of Labor & Employment, 2012). This 
ideological frame of the uranium mill as a source of family stability is a direct product of the 
symbolic status of former uranium mills, specifically the uranium milling town of Uravan, as the 
nexus of community and the uranium industry. Exemplifying this perspective, Bill Thompson, a 
former employee at the Uravan mill, commented during the 2010 meeting in Nucla (Transcript 
of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 32): 
Every summer we had summer students who came in and worked in the area, they 
worked in the mill doing odd jobs. And they came back from college and they had a 
summer job that they came to and worked and they went off and got a college degree. 
 
For those who remember the Uravan mill in full swing, the town was not only a major industrial 




became a provider, ensuring steady jobs, good wages, and most importantly opportunities for 
local kids to seek higher education. Continuing on with his argument for why the CDPHE should 
approve Energy Fuel’s mill license, Thompson notes (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, 
p. 33): 
And there’s graduation pictures, you know, and there’s yellow ribbons around them or 
they’ve written, you know, where they are and, you know, we miss you, this or that. And 
it’s a pretty touching thing to see that, you know, the options for young kids in Naturita 
isn’t the same as someone from the big city. So I think we can do better than that. And I 
would like to see those kids have a better chance. 
 
Yellow ribbons, usually symbolic of individuals who are enlisted with the United States military, 
serve as a metonymic tool for exemplifying how the young in the West End have few 
opportunities for employment. In the mind of proponents such as Thompson, approving the 
uranium mill is not simply a matter of providing a source of revenue and employment for locals, 
it means providing opportunities for the young to gain employment and stability without having 
to leave the community. With around 57% of the students in the local school district on free 
lunches in 2010, the uranium mill becomes a caretaker for not only the community’s present, but 
future as well. Furthermore, Thompson’s quote typifies the pervasive nostalgia proponents 
express for the “good old days” before the closure of Uravan and the collapse of the uranium 
industry, a time when community members did not have to leave home to seek employment. 
Community proponents see the debate over Piñon Ridge as both a moment to reminisce on the 
boom times of previous decades, and to draw a parallel between the opportunities provided then 
and what Piñon Ridge, if approved, could do for the community.    
From a Heideggerian point of view, the symbolic frame of the uranium mill as 
community caretaker turns the idea of sorge on its head; here the uranium mill, a material 




brought it into existence. Using a broad notion of what the environment is, sorge becomes a 
pathway through which the recalcitrant nature of the material world serves as protector rather 
than inhibitor of human industrial development. Furthermore, by serving symbolically as a 
caretaker for the community, the proponents in the community generate sorge for the mill itself. 
For proponents, the people and the mill are bound to each other; without one or the other the idea 
of family as it pertains to the West End communities disintegrates.  
Family as Past and Future 
The sorge generated between the mill and the community not only indicates a deep bond 
between local notions of community and uranium, but also brings into question how this 
symbolic representation of “uranium mill as family” alters the notions of what brought about the 
end to the previous uranium boom, and how Piñon Ridge will differ. The question that arises 
from this relationship is why do community members view the uranium mill as a caretaker? Why 
not the company, or the government that made the uranium industry viable? In this space, 
examining how proponents frame the uranium mill as community versus the actual history of 
uranium milling in the region serves to explain the sorge generated between the two. William 
Lobato, a resident of Nucla and at the time of the 2010 meetings a Nucla Town Council member, 
characterized the approval of Piñon Ridge as an extension of over a century of mining and 
milling in the region (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 96): 
We need this mill and we want this mill. The area around us will support it. We are a 
mining district, the largest mining district in the state of Colorado, and we’ve been in 
existence for a hundred years. 
 
Lobato’s statement teases out a key element as to why proponents see Piñon Ridge as a caretaker 
for the community: continuity of community and uranium mining and milling as one over a 100-




one implicitly states two things: the uranium industry has existed either as a direct or indirect 
product of mining for 100 years, and that despite the ups and downs of the industry, the 
community and the uranium (specifically the uranium mill) have forged on. Another proponent, 
Angelica Oberson, emphasizes the idea of continuity of people and uranium mining and milling 
over this century long period of time (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, Volume II, 2012, p. 
283): 
I'm a resident of Nucla. I have been here most of my life. I have had four generations of 
family here. In fact, I can trace on my grandpa's side all the way back to the pioneers. My 
grandpa was a uranium miner, so was my step-grandpa. This area has lived with uranium 
as long as we can remember. 
 
Living with uranium, and in turn the industry necessary to process the ore, creates a sense of 
“deep time” that emphasizes how West Enders have coexisted with the material aspects of the 
uranium industry (uranium ore, uranium mining, and uranium milling) since before memory. 
Inadvertently co-opting aboriginal concepts of human-natural world relationships, Oberson 
shows how community proponents view the history of uranium mining and milling in the West 
End as a single line of events and people extending back to the first settlers of the region.  
Deep time, within the context of community-industry relations, explains why proponents refer to 
the mill, rather than Energy Fuels itself, as the focus of their support. Though the Uravan 
Mineral Belt is unique in that the primary center of uranium operations, Uravan, was in the hands 
of a single corporation (Union Carbide) from the late 1920s until the end of operations in 1986, 
the greater landscape of the uranium industry since the discovery of carnotite ore in 1898 is an 
amalgam of producers of all shapes and sizes (Amundson, 2002; Shumway, 1970). Uranium 
companies will come and go, as they have in the past, but the uranium, and in turn the facilities 




By transforming the uranium mill from product of specific organizations’ business plans 
into a part of the deep time history of the community, uranium milling becomes a human 
generated extension of the material reality of western Colorado, capable within the boundaries of 
a bounded constitutive relationship of both acting and being acted upon by proponents. Uranium 
milling becomes the community’s caretaker, as it is the centerpiece of local society, a source of 
consistency echoing back through time to the earliest residents.  
Uranium also makes these communities relevant on a global scale, as evidenced by Grand 
Junction resident Jacque Stafford’s “tale” of his father’s interactions with the pioneers of nuclear 
science (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 51):  “Our family has been in 
uranium/vanadium since the early 1900s. My father has the oldest mine in the United States. He 
spoke to Madame Curie.”  Stafford’s anecdote reinforces the deep time relationship between 
western Coloradans and uranium, framing the uranium industry as the reason why his father was 
able to meet the discoverer of radium, the first material found in uranium bearing ores of interest, 
despite the fact he lived and worked in western Colorado. Thus, in the frame of proponents of the 
mill, the materiality of uranium mining and milling extending back into the community’s deep 
time embeds the industry’s operations with deep symbolic meaning. Proponents see the uranium 
mines and mills as a connection to their ancestor’s pioneer past, a space where community and 
family coexisted within the space of the mine or mill (i.e., Uravan), and an industry that made 
them relevant to the greater world.  
 The problem with viewing the uranium industry in this context, however, is that 
continuity assumes the uranium industry has and will always exist in the West End. At a high 
level, this conclusion avoids the complex issues associated with an industry that has, since the 




Information Administration, 1993; United States Energy Information Administration, 2012). 
Historical information, specifically the post-Shinkbolowe mine bust of the mid-1920s and the 
uranium collapse of the 1980s, indicate that rather than being a continuous industry, uranium 
mining and milling is at best a boom and bust industry, prone to the effects of outside forces such 
as the former Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) policies, U.S. non-proliferation goals, and 
power plant accidents (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982; J. H. Taylor & Yokell, 1979; Watts, 
2012). At worst, it could be argued that the uranium industry in the United States is completely 
unstable, as it is heavily dependent upon federal policies such as the circulars program of the late 
1940s and 50s and the federal ban on imported uranium during the late 1960s and 70s 
(Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982; Amundson, 2002). Furthermore, the uranium industry has not 
yet shown the ability to function in a free-market global uranium market at levels of operation 
similar to those of its Cold War predecessors. Arguing the uranium industry has always existed 
and always will exist in the region assumes that certain socioeconomic conditions have always 
and will always exist in the region. This fatalist view of life in the West End poses some serious 
challenges to the notion of uranium milling as community, forcing community members to 
grapple with mythical notions (i.e., the Balsley myth or “Steenified” version) of development in 
the region.  
Uranium Mining and Milling as Fatalism 
“Most of us from here are not worried. We were raised here, we were schooled here, 
raised our families here, and when our time’s up they’re going to bury us on Boot Hill 
beside the rest of all our family” (Transcript of Public Comments #1, 2010, p. 58). 
 
For proponents of Piñon Ridge, life in the West End is as constant as the proverbial northern star. 
People live here, die here, and are buried on the metaphorical hill to which all true pioneers are 




of an overarching fatalist philosophy shared by those who see their lives as an extension of the 
edge-of-existence shared by the first residents of the West End. Summarizing this notion best, 
Marilyn Adamson noted during the 2010 meeting in Montrose (Transcript of Public Comments 
#2, 2010, p. 117): 
My grandparents were pioneers, they came here in covered wagons. They made it 
through the boom/bust people are talking about. It’s an eternal thing in the state of 
Colorado. If the snows go away, the ski areas go bust. This is the way it is. 
 
If a single phrase could convey how proponents of Piñon Ridge feel about the pace and the way 
of life it would be “The Way It Is.” The West End of Montrose County has by and large survived 
on the cycles of boom and bust industries. From radium to uranium, and anything in between, 
residents expect booms and busts. In the context of Piñon Ridge, Bob Roberts remarks how 
booms and busts are not what keep people living in the West End (Reporter's Transcript of 
Hearing, Volume VI, 2012, pp. 1097-1098): 
We do agree, we do understand, that yes, this is a boom/bust type of enterprise. We also 
realize that it could be in three months or it could be in 18 months that this mill begins 
construction. We are willing to wait. We're not here waiting for the mill. We're not stuck 
here, hoping that the mill's going to start so that we can have jobs. We work. We love the 
area. That's why we're here. 
 
Bob Roberts’ use of tautology to exemplify how, despite protestations otherwise, West Enders 
are not looking to secure the mill at any costs, serves to counter the notion that proponents are at 
a certain level ambivalent about the success of Piñon Ridge. The problem with this statement is 
twofold; first, Bob Roberts, like other proponents, is only participating in these meetings because 
he has made a conscious decision to petition the CDPHE to approve the mill license again. 
Second, much like Adamson’s remark, Bob Roberts’ analysis of the current economic situation 
in the West End reinforces this fatalist approach to life in the West End. Conversely, Margo 




transcript) frames the uranium mill project as a form of community survival, directing the failure 
to bring this project to fruition on to those against the mill (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, 
Volume VI, 2012, p. 1212): 
I've watched this community dwindle in the last 20 years. My husband and I were 
married here in 1988 at the Assembly of God Church right down the road. We have 
watched people leave. We've watched entire families disappear. It's not the community it 
used to be. It's very tiny, and we're suffocating. We're trying to succeed here, and we're 
doing whatever we can to make that happen. And we just feel like people have sat against 
us to stop us from succeeding. 
 
The last two sentences of Margo Roberts’ statement serve to reinforce the two earlier points. 
Employing alliteration as a means to emphasize the anguish caused by opponents of the mill, 
Margo Roberts concurs with Adamson’s and Bob Roberts’ fatalist frame of life in the West End, 
arguing that opponents need not make their (West Ender’s) lives any harder than they are. 
Furthermore, Margo Roberts, unlike Bob Roberts, openly connects the success of the Piñon 
Ridge project to overall community revival. In doing so, Margo Roberts inadvertently addresses 
a major paradox in how uranium mining and milling symbolically function in West End culture. 
A uranium mill and the community generate sorge for each other, but much like the case of the 
land surrounding the Skull Valley Reservation in Clarke’s study, the community and the uranium 
mill generate certain conditions that both the community and the mill must grapple with (Clarke, 
2010). In essence, the community binds the uranium mill to certain conditions of socioeconomic 
development in society, while the mill itself binds the community to the consequences of relying 
on extractive industries for community stability. Using Heidegger’s terminology, the material 
world of the uranium mill enframes the community and vice versa, leaving both bound in a 
relationship steeped in predetermined notions of local socioeconomics. People, like uranium, 




Hanford Reservation to the materiality of the nuclear technology they brought/brought them into 
existence (Kinsella, 2007).  
Fatalism as Past and Future 
 From a historical perspective, two major elements drive the socioeconomic enframing of 
uranium milling by proponents of Piñon Ridge: mythic notions of development in the West End 
and, more disturbingly, assumptions concerning what development options are available for 
residents to choose. In the case of the first, mythic notions of development in the West End, 
proponents draw from the same reservoir of ideas as Howard Balsley did, emphasizing the role 
of the lone miner in the development of the uranium industry, and either ignoring or demonizing 
the role of the federal government in the process (Hough, 1958; Sullenberger, 1992; Uranium 
Magazine, 1958a, 1958c). Either frame serves the same purpose: to pose the uranium industry as 
a product of the hard work of local residents rather than a concerted effort by the United States to 
develop an industry for the purpose of serving the nuclear weapons complex and power industry. 
Explaining the role of mining and milling in the lives of West End residents, Robert Olvera 
argues (Transcript of Public Comments #1, 2010, p. 58):  
But we don’t want to be like them, we have our own identity and are proud of it. Give us 
the choice of working in a mill or a deep, dark mine, or swabbing toilets and waiting on 
ungrateful people, we’ll taking mining and milling any day. 
 
Implicitly, Olvera juxtaposes the uranium-centric identity of West Enders with the “degrading” 
jobs associated with the tourism based service industry opponents in the town of Telluride 
depend upon. Uranium mining and milling is in this context a respectable job, one that someone 
can earn a good living without becoming a servant to outsiders. Along the same lines, Joyce 
Shaffer accuses other “outsiders” of forcing their notions of what economic development should 




Our mill closed, not because we did not meet the state recommendation, our mill closed 
because of outside uranium that was brought in. By the deal that was signed by our 
government to undermine the jobs of the people that pay the taxes that support this 
government. 
 
Framing outsiders as destroyers who only seek to take the identity and economic stability of 
West Enders away serves as a highly effective rhetorical tool for driving a wedge between local 
residents and those present at the hearings from outside the community. Here, the deep time 
relationship between proponents and the uranium industry, coupled with mythic notions of the 
early industry that have their roots in the same narratives as Balsley’s recount of the early radium 
industry, and reinforced by tales of self-made uraniumaires such as Steen, shift the 
socioeconomic problems associated with the past and future of the uranium industry on to others.  
The historical records of the uranium industry in the United States, however, show that it 
was outsiders such as Frenchman Charles Poulot who began the first actual uranium milling 
operations in the region, and that these operations served clients in Europe rather than the United 
States (Amundson, 2002; Shumway, 1970). Furthermore, both the radium and the two uranium 
booms were part of a concerted effort on the part of industry and the federal government, both 
based primarily outside of the region, to develop and process the Uravan Mineral Belt. Shaffer’s 
accusation that the federal government undermined the uranium industry in the West End avoids 
addressing the question of how the uranium industry came into existence. Prior to the nuclear 
power boom of the late 1960s and 70s, the uranium industry in the United States almost 
completely depended upon AEC ore buying programs (Albrethsen & McGinley, 1982). It was 
during this period towns such as Uravan, Moab, Grants, and the like grew into major industrial 
centers (Amundson, 2002). Failing to grapple with this complex relationship between the federal 




uranium milling as an industry that is necessary for community identity and, if left to its own 
devices, will naturally serve the caretaker purpose it has in the past.  
Along the same lines, proponents who focus on uranium milling as the solution to the 
socioeconomic ills of the West End create an environment where the uranium industry itself 
enframes the community, binding it to the boom bust cycles common to extractive industries. 
This relationship, all the more disturbing as it is the product of a human generated materiality 
(the uranium industry), twists the relationship between humans and their technologies, allowing 
the act of enframing in the Heideggerian sense to come from humans, be channeled through their 
technologies, and imposed on other humans, either those who are alive or could be alive in the 
future. Uranium milling as the focus of community development is in this context paradoxical: it 
could serve as a pathway for socioeconomic development, but will in turn enframe the 
community to accept the notions of boom and bust cycles as part of everyday community life. 
Dianna Reams shows how engrained the notion of uranium mining and milling as the only viable 
socioeconomic development solution is by explaining how the consequences of its boom bust 
cycle make tourism an untenable solution for the region (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, 
Volume VI, 2012, pp. 1149-1150): 
I get that Moab and Telluride are tourism based. We are not. We are not tourist based. 
You have to have something to come to, a destination. You have to have services and 
goods. Currently you can't get breakfast every day of the week here, and you can't get 
supper every day of the week here. And I haven't seen the people that are participating in 
these hearings having even their lunch here, participating in our economy. And that's 
fine. It's their choice. That's the free market. That's what we get. We're good with it. 
 
Hyperbole or not, Reams emphasis on the lack of available services necessary to sustain a 
tourism industry serves to emphasize how within the context of the local community, no money 
exists to develop the community to the extent necessary to delve into any other industries besides 




Continuing her argument during the same hearing session Reams places the blame for 
lack of socioeconomic development traction on “outsiders” (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, 
Volume VI, 2012, p. 1152):  
We have reached out to Telluride and Moab. We have tried to talk to the people that are 
having such a difficult time with us trying to run, operate, and grow our own community. 
It's just not going to happen. So with that, I would like to offer you 81 percent of our 
population supportive of this mill and these comments for your consideration. 
 
The use of anaphora to emphasize the efforts undertaken by “we” the community to engage with 
outsiders such as mill opposition groups based in Telluride and Moab serves to both pit the 
community against those outside of the community against the project and emphasize how the 
community has examined all possible options to development, and found uranium mining and 
milling to be the only viable option. Others, such as Margo Roberts, Ernest Williams, and 
Terrence Esch also emphasize the “one solution” approach to development, arguing that the 
“outsiders’” option of tourism is not possible in a community comprised of farmers, ranchers, 
miners, truck drivers, and carpenters (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 91).  
Materially, the uranium industry served historically as a source of substantial income for 
the region, allowing former towns such as Uravan to build schools and hire the best medical 
professionals in the region (Amundson, 2002). However, human beings become a “resource” of 
the mill in their own right, necessary for operations but also bound to the material reality of the 
uranium industry. Consequently, even as towns such as Uravan or Moab grew because of the 
uranium industry, the community became ever more bound to the mill. The mill needed skilled 
labor to run the actual metallurgical operations and mine the uranium for processing, while at the 
same time the community needed the income generated from the mill to build infrastructure, start 
businesses, and provide opportunities for education. Underlying this relationship was the idea 




the community for a substantive amount of time. The realities of extractive industries, especially 
one dependent on federal involvement, meant that this approach to development would only 
work so long as outsiders saw extraction and processing as valuable.  
Consequently, Uravan’s stability also became the greater West End’s downfall: with the 
only mill in the region operating out of a company town, the closure of the mill also meant the 
loss of facilities many residents had depended upon. Uravan was the caretaker of many families, 
and within the context of this relationship between the uranium mill and the residents of the 
region, it is no wonder many refused to leave the town during the initial stages of the cleanup 
(Amundson, 2002). Development in the region was “tidally locked” to the uranium industry and 
in turn many residents had only ever known socioeconomic growth derived from the economic 
impact of uranium extraction and processing.  
To draw from the language of development economics, the West End fell into a “resource 
trap” (see Collier, 2007, 2010) whereby the material effects of uranium development became 
symbolic of what development must look like. As a counter to this paradigm, some residents, 
such as B. Roberts, argue that the community is open to other types of development (Reporter's 
Transcript of Hearing, Volume VI, 2012, p. 1101): 
I have yet to see any of the folks here or anybody from their area bringing anything into 
this community, Nucla or Naturita, making investments, bringing in businesses, coming 
down and talking to people and saying, Hey, let us help you create an industry. 
 
Even here though, the fatalist notions of socioeconomic development in the region are evident. 
By placing the burden of economic development on the shoulders of those opposed to the mill, 
B. Roberts argues that it is the fault of outsiders, rather than the community itself, that they lack 




that since the uranium industry collapsed in the 1980s, the West End has struggled with 
developing a meaningful identity for itself that does not include uranium mining and milling.  
The Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill project has only brought the deep and oft-conflicting 
struggle over community identity to the surface as residents are forced to defend their long held 
notions of the uranium industry in a forum where opponents actively attack their beliefs 
concerning the material and symbolic relationship between themselves and uranium mining and 
milling. This challenge is made all the more potent by the fact that while residents do not 
actively recognize the deeper material and symbolic relationship between themselves and the 
mill, they do recognize, and use as a tool of argumentation, their knowledge of uranium mining 
and milling as a justification for approving the radioactive materials’ license for Piñon Ridge.  
Uranium Mining and Milling as Expertise 
Proponents of Piñon Ridge made it a point during the course of the two meetings and the 
hearing to make note of their personal expertise concerning the operation of uranium recovery 
facilities. Technocratic expertise serves to provide a certain level of validity within the context of 
the highly technical licensing process. Bob Beverly, speaking during the 2010 Montrose meeting 
in favor the mill, exemplifies the application of technological expertise as a tool to argue for the 
mill license (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 55): 
I was director of environmental and radiation control for Union Carbide mining and 
metals division. We operated over a hundred mines and seventy milling operations, four 
in Colorado, one was here in Montrose County. 
 
Here, Beverly both announces his association with one of the largest uranium producers in the 
United States during the boom of the 1970s and his personal expertise in environmental and 
radiation issues pertaining to the State of Colorado. Implicit in this statement is Beverly’s 




Mill project is suitable for radioactive materials licensing. At a deeper level, Beverly lays the 
foundation for symbolically constructing knowledge concerning the proper development of a 
uranium mill site, as a reservoir from which proponents draw the validity of their claims for the 
uranium mill from. Tammy Sutherland, a West Ender, transmutes the technocratic language of 
Beverly’s statement into a more direct argument as to why the CDPHE should approve the 
uranium mill (Transcript of Public Comments #1, 2010, p. 24): 
We have the natural resources here. We have the people who know the industry inside 
and out. They know how it was in the past and they’ve worked every day, every moment 
trying to make it better.  
 
Emphasizing the wealth of experiences available in this knowledge “reservoir” though a 
tautological emphasis on the steady process of innovation to ensure proper industry growth and 
development, Sutherland’s statement clarifies the underpinning enframing occurring on the part 
of proponents who employ technical expertise as part of the justification for why the CDPHE 
should approve the mill. Enframing at its core is about subjugating the material world to serve 
the needs of humanity; technocratic expertise, the very embodiment of the notion that the 
physical world can and should be controlled, is the purest form of enframing. Thus, for those 
who utilize their technical expertise as part of their argumentation for Piñon Ridge, the physical 
challenges, be they health, environmental, or socioeconomic, are surmountable, given the right 
people and technology.  
Expertise in the Past and Future? 
Enframing the uranium industry as within the grasp of technically proficient residents 
echoes common themes throughout other sites in both the “old” and the New Nuclear West. 
Kinsella’s analysis of the Hanford Reservation also shows a strong inclination on the part of 




the cougars that roam near sites where effluent poured from the N-Reactor (Kinsella, 2007). 
Much like those cougars, however, the people who claim technical proficiency in relation to the 
uranium industry also see their responsibility to engage in the extraction and processing of 
uranium as transcendent of mere technological concerns. Paul Szilagyi, and employee of 
Nuvemco LLC, a local uranium mining company, characterized the responsibility the CDPHE 
has to allow the Piñon Ridge license to go through as allowing mining and milling companies in 
the region to fulfill a holy purpose (Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, p. 50): 
We’re in the heart of the Uravan Mineral Belt where God has chosen to deposit great 
amounts of uranium and vanadium in our country where the US Department of Energy 
has its reserves for our country, which you’re very familiar with. 
 
Szilagyi goes on to explain how the experience and knowledge generated in the past, primarily 
from failures of business operation and regulation, will serve to make the Piñon Ridge Uranium 
Mill a safer operation that will benefit the entire United States. In doing so, Szilagyi’s statement 
exposes the challenges associated with enframing the uranium industry when a part of the 
uranium industry, the uranium mill, and the community share sorge for each other. The personal 
nature of uranium mining and milling, generated by the strong relationship between community 
and the uranium mill, runs up against the notion of the community as responsible caretaker of the 
material they seek to extract.  
 My analysis of the statements of proponents of the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill project 
from a socioeconomic standpoint shows that above all else, there exists a deeply embedded 
sorge-enframing duality between the material matrix of the uranium industry, specifically the 
uranium mill, and the local West End community’s notions of what role the uranium industry 
plays in their community. Out of this analysis three major themes appear.  First, despite the 




notions of community professed by locals, West Ender proponents of Piñon Ridge see the mill as 
a continuation of a century-long involvement in uranium that brought about a great deal of 
wealth and importance for what was and still is a remote community. Second, the personification 
of uranium mills as caretakers of the regional community enframes the community itself within 
the recalcitrant nature of a extractive industry that has/does operate within an environment of 
significant federal and state involvement. Finally, when combined with the previous two themes 
generated during my analysis, the traditional technocratic enframing of the challenges of the 
uranium industry as within the purview of the expertise of community residents in favor of the 
mill serves not to strengthen their arguments for the mill, but bring into question whether or not 
they are in fact capable of successfully guiding the community forwards.  
Deeply personal and profoundly interconnected, the boundaries between community 
proponents, nuclear technology, and the physical space they share barely exist, if in fact they do 
exist at all. For those who strongly identify with the uranium industry in the West End, the 
uranium mill is community and the community is the uranium mill. They are one and the same, 
and have been so since before the memory of those who currently live there. Consequently, 
proponents’ ability to discern between themselves and the industry is compromised by an 
inability or unwillingness to critically evaluate the events of the past 60+ years. When the 
historical information associated with the uranium industry during this period in time comes into 
play, the notion that proponents who are part or have been part of the uranium industry in the 
past have the knowledge necessary to guide the industry forwards in the future assumes that they 
are capable of avoiding the pitfalls they or their predecessors fell into during the uranium booms 




the material and symbolic aspects of the uranium industry and the community, I strongly 
question whether this assumption is a valid one.  
Uranium Futures 
Aside from the more direct visions of Piñon Ridge as a source of direct and indirect jobs 
that could potentially lead to anywhere between $50 and $100 million dollars of direct and 
indirect capital to the regional economy, proponents also see the potential future, should the 
CDPHE approve the mill license, in a multitude of ways (Excessive Energy Regulations and 
Policies, 2011; Transcript of Public Comments #1, 2010, p. 48). Ranging from the pragmatic to 
the altruistic, proponents see Piñon Ridge as a source of energy independence, a dual-purpose 
business that allows them to leverage both traditional and alternative energy technology needs, 
and finally a provider of health solutions for those who suffer from serious diseases.  
In the first of these cases, proponents cite the nuclear industry, and implicitly the idea of a 
nuclear renaissance, as an opportunity for the United States to achieve energy independence from 
foreign sources of uranium and other fuels. Primarily concentrated in the 2010 meetings, these 
statements echo common political themes during an election cycle typified by the emergence of 
Tea Party candidates, such as proponent and local Tea Party-backed Republican party candidate 
Bob McConnell, who argued achieving energy independence was the “highest national priority” 
(Transcript of Public Comments #2, 2010, pp. 101-102). Given the themes of self-sufficiency 
common throughout proponent’s argumentation for the mill, as well as the lack of statements to 
this effect during the 2012 hearing, the theme of energy independence via a nuclear renaissance 
was, much like the rhetoric of fighting communism through uranium extraction during the 1950s, 
more a justification for approving the mill license rather than an coherent argument as to why 




Conversely, the other two themes, uranium as a metaphorical and potentially physical 
“byproduct” of an alternative energy future and uranium as a source of life curing medicine, only 
appear during the 2012 hearing. These two arguments show both the changes in the views of 
proponents since the first meetings in early 2010 as well as their ability to formulate arguments 
that would appeal to a wider audience than just those living in the West End. Reorienting the 
argument for Piñon Ridge away from the more contentious issue of uranium extraction, Dianna 
Reams poses vanadium as the real source of long-term benefits for the West End (Reporter's 
Transcript of Hearing, Volume VI, 2012, pp. 1145-1146): 
Yes, this area has been economically depressed for over 30 years. One of the reasons—
one of the reasons is because of the loss of the uranium and vanadium industry, both 
mining and milling. When that industry started here back in the '30s and '40s, it was for 
vanadium. Uranium was a byproduct. Vanadium also, I believe personally, is going to be 
the driving ore for this area because it is a primary constituent as a steel hardener as well 
as vanadium redox batteries, which the renewable energy industry is finding as the only 
source of long-term storage for solar and wind power. If uranium is again a byproduct I 
say, Okay. That's fine with me. 
 
By shifting the argument away from uranium, Reams attempts to avoid the paradoxical 
relationship between responsible development and the consequences of uranium extraction. 
From the point of view of someone who does not understand the nature of uranium-bearing 
deposits in the West End, the reorientation of argumentation for Piñon Ridge towards vanadium 
appears to be an attempt to avoid the complex sorge-enframing duality associated with the 
uranium industry in the region. However, due to the material nature of uranium ore on the 
Uravan Mineral Belt, specifically the fact that the most common type of ore, carnotite bears both 
uranium and vanadium, a rhetorical shift from uranium to vanadium as the purpose of approving 
Piñon Ridge does not change the material fact that any vanadium milling operations will by the 
nature of the chemistry of the ore require extracting uranium (Fischer & Hilpert, 1952; Merritt, 




uranium or the vanadium becomes the primary source of income for the community, the mill will 
process and sell both materials. Depending on vanadium will still bind the community to the 
same conditions as in the uranium industry, even more so because of the impact the federal 
government has upon current developments in the alternative energy industry.  
Similarly, proponents in the 2012 hearing argue that the not-yet-discussed benefits of 
approving the Piñon Ridge radioactive materials license include the benefits derived from 
nuclear medicine. Bob and Margo Roberts both make this claim during the 2012 hearing, with 
the former arguing it is a source of jobs as of yet unaccounted for in the overall “health” 
evaluation of the mill project (Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, Volume VI, 2012, p. 1099):  
Uranium and various radioactive isotopes from the radioactive ore processing are used in 
all kinds of—for instance, medical purposes such as radio imaging, x-rays, MRIs, et 
cetera. They use radioactive isotopes in cancer treatment. Think of all the peripheral jobs 
this one mill will create. 
 
Much like in the case of Reams putting primacy on vanadium processing as the primary benefit 
of approving Piñon Ridge, emphasizing the economic and health value of nuclear medicine 
derived from uranium vastly oversimplifies the recalcitrant nature of radioactive materials. While 
uranium is necessary for the production of medical isotopes, uranium produced during the 
mining and milling process is by no means assured to go into the production of medical isotopes. 
The uranium derived from milling operations largely serves the needs of the nuclear power 
industry, where the largest demand exists. Even if the uranium produced from Piñon Ridge went 
to serve the purposes of producing medical isotopes for cancer treatment, the duality of the 
sorge-enframing relationship between the community and the mill would still exist.  
Moving Forward 
The bounded constitutive nature of the relationship between proponents of the mill in the 




and development, including long-term community identity and stability. Bound in a sorge-
enframing duality, the community and the mill are “trapped”, in a development sense, in a space 
where the number of available futures in terms of options for growth and development are 
constrained by the nature of the uranium industry itself and the community’s preconceived 
notions of development. Furthermore, the lack of any meaningful space within the public 
engagement processes associated with the approval of uranium mill licenses indicates a need to 
reevaluate what questions are relevant to the licensing process and how current policies should 
change to address these concerns. These questions, and the future of uranium milling as a 
pathway for socioeconomic development for the West End, are the focus of the final chapter of 






























 With all remaining blocks at this stage removed, the CDPHE must make a decision 
whether to approve or reject the Piñon Ridge radioactive materials license before April 27, 2013. 
The state has met all the requirements of a hearing as per the Radiation Control Act; heard and 
denied an appeal from the Sheep Mountain Alliance and its allies; and promised, in the words of 
first name Urbina, to consider all the social and economic factors at play. For Energy Fuels and 
the residents of the West End who have sought this mill for over five years, the end of this part 
of the journey is within sight, and the future of the New Nuclear West appears to have the 
potential to provide these communities with the socioeconomic stability via uranium mining and 
milling they seek.  
 Still, the question remains: will Piñon Ridge be good for the community? From an 
environmental and health point of view, this question is still up for debate, and will continue to 
be even if Energy Fuels builds the mill. From a socioeconomic perspective, however, the 
question is not whether the mill is good for the community, but rather whether the mill and the 
community are good for each other. My analysis of proponent’s argumentation in the three 
transcripts generated during the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment’s mill 
licensing process identifies the presence of a sorge-enframing duality between the uranium mill 
itself and the community. Community members in favor of the uranium mill see uranium milling 
as community, a space where the mill becomes the community’s caretaker, providing jobs, 
services, and opportunities for the young. Thus, as the mill generates sorge, or care, for the 




operation going and promote the development of new ones. This concurs with Amundson’s 
(2002) conclusion that uranium milling, or yellowcake, towns generated a strong sense of 
community that bound the people of the community to the mill(s) and to each other (pp. 177-
178).  
However, the sorge generated between the community and the mill has a darker side; 
even as the material and the symbolic, the mill and the community, care for each other, they 
inexorably bind each other to the recalcitrant nature of a relationship steeped in preconceived 
notions of development and extractive industry economics. Community members, confident in 
their technical knowledge of uranium mining and milling developed over the last century of 
extraction, suffer from a fatalist philosophy of life that promotes “deep time” continuity between 
their struggles and those of the West End residents that came before them, and posits that mining 
and milling are the only viable options for development in the region. This philosophy enframes 
uranium mills as the only solution to development, placing a disproportionate burden upon it to 
provide for the region.  
Along the same lines, the relationship between the community and uranium milling also 
suffers from the challenges inherent in an extractive industry with a long history of federal 
involvement. Primary commodities, materials such as minerals, timber, and the like, go through 
boom and bust cycles associated with the macroeconomic and political factors that drive supply 
and demand. In the case of the uranium industry in the United States however, federal 
involvement in the form of economic levers such as the Atomic Energy Commission’s ore 
buying program and the federal government’s embargo on foreign uranium imports created a 
market where none existed before. Drawing on the language employed by western historians, the 




and consequently their demise. Though the end of the “old” Nuclear West as it pertains to the 
uranium industry came about during a “free market” bust in yellowcake prices, the bust was a 
product of both free market forces and government intervention on the part of both the United 
States and other major uranium industry players such as France and Australia.  
Nonetheless, proponents choose not to acknowledge how important the federal 
government was in establishing and sustaining the uranium industry, preferring to frame the 
development of the uranium industry as a product of enterprising locals and free market forces. 
In this way, proponents see themselves and Energy Fuels as entrepreneurial spirits, working 
together to establish a future for their community that leaves them free from the binds of reliance 
on government funds for everything from basic services to education. This symbolic 
representation of the uranium industry, however, does not change the facts. By posing uranium 
milling as necessary for the community’s long-term stability, proponents inadvertently enframe 
their community, restraining its ability to grow and develop to the recalcitrant nature of the 
uranium industry. This enframing forces the community to accept the consequences of uranium 
industry economics and politics, including volatile prices, massive environmental regulation, and 
a long history of government intervention focused on generating raw materials for nuclear 
weapons and power (Balogh, 1991).  
The sorge-enframing duality I have outlined above applies to not only the case of Piñon 
Ridge, but other sites in the New Nuclear West as well. While Clarke does not use the phrase 
sorge-enframing duality, she does acknowledge that the relationship between the Skull Valley 
Goshute Tribe and the world in which they live is a system where the material and symbolic 
aspects of the tribe and the world serve to justify both enframing and generating sorge for the 




importance of the bounded constitutive model as a means of understanding the cultural notions 
of the relationships between the material and symbolic aspects of a community’s world that in 
the case of the New Nuclear West, human generated material aspects of the world, steeped as 
they are in culturally suffused notions of life and death, are just as much a part of the material 
world as the landscapes that surround them. Other sites in the New Nuclear West, in particular 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, also show signs of this duality, and 
deserve further study through the use of the bounded constitutive model (Morgan, 2008). This 
relationship, and the complications that arise from it in terms of the greater landscape of the New 
Nuclear West, clearly show the importance of examining the argumentation of both proponents 
and opponents of the introduction of nuclear technology and materials into their communities.  
The New Nuclear West, as the confluence of both historical notions of nuclear 
technology in the American West and beliefs concerning the future of nuclear power is both 
unique and an extension of common themes throughout the history of the American West 
(Amundson, 2002). Consequently, the people who live in the New Nuclear West today struggle 
with their conflicting identities as “victims and survivors”, as well as successors, of the Nuclear 
West (Ringholz, 2002, p. 322). In this way, the argumentation of supporters of Piñon Ridge can 
be seen as an attempt to separate the various forces, both material and symbolic, that shape their 
lives in to a coherent argument that adheres to their “linear” philosophy of life in the West End.  
In any event, this duality, and the complications that arise in terms of the future of the 
uranium industry in the West End from it, is a problem where technical information will not 
serve to tease out the many conflicting narratives present amongst proponents of Piñon Ridge. 
Addressing this space will require reevaluating the current public engagement processes 




issues associated with development pathways will be as important as the once ignored 
environmental and health concerns that typified the primary challenges of the “old” Nuclear 
West. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this question, and address the challenges the 
community faces in terms of charting a future course for socioeconomic development for the 
region.  
Public Engagement Beyond Piñon Ridge 
The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA), the first 
substantive amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 from an environmental perspective, 
was never meant to address issues concerning the social and economic implications of uranium 
mills on the communities that reside in the major uranium producing regions of the United 
States. In fact, as Eric Mogren argues, UMTRCA almost did not fulfill the role outlined in the act 
itself, as business interests and the Reagan administration sought to limit its effect, going so far 
as to make the law significantly friendlier for milling companies by shifting the burden of both 
environmental and economic costs on to the taxpaying public (Mogren, 2002, pp. 175-176). 
Furthermore, the opening paragraph of UMTRCA constrains the act’s purpose to health and 
environmental issues alone ("Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act," 1978): 
The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare and the regulation of interstate 
commerce require that every reasonable effort be made to provide for the stabilization, 
disposal, and control in a safe and environmentally sound manner of such tailings in 
order to prevent or minimize radon diffusion into the environment and to prevent or 
minimize other environmental hazards from such tailings. 
 
At no point in this or the subsequent listed purposes of UMTRCA does the law consider anything 
beyond health and environmental concerns related to the communities that live in and around 
uranium mills. The fact that subsequent legislation at the state and federal level require public 




and health laws of the 1970s such as  the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, 
and Clean Air Act, rather than any serious effort from within the nuclear community itself . 
Public engagement associated with uranium milling stemming from UMTRCA only serves to 
provide a forum for vetting the environmental and health issues associated with a particular 
industrial operation. Members of the public with concerns regarding the social and economic 
issues stemming from a particular project have, in the strictest sense, no space to express their 
concerns.  
Echoing this fundamental problem with the current structure of uranium mill licensing 
laws and regulations, Judge Dana noted in his 2013 summary of the events of the 2012 hearing 
the legal challenges posed by the wide gulf between socioeconomic concerns raised by 
proponents and health and environmental concerns raised by opponents (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Ruling, 2013, emphasis added): 
Decisions to allow the mining, milling and use of uranium have been made by the United 
States Congress through the Atomic Energy Act and the Uranium Mill Radiation Control Act 
and by the legislative process in Colorado through the Radiation Control Act. Through the 
agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the provisions of the Radiation 
Control Act the regulation of the nuclear industry has been delegated to CDPHE which also 
receives its funding through the state budgetary process. Perhaps the more collegiate 
process suggested in the testimony of Dr. Grossman would produce a superior result but it 
is not the process provided by law. The statutory obligation of CDPHE to consider Energy 
Fuel’s application may conflict with both its mission statement and its vision. Neither 
CDPHE nor its appointed hearing officer has the authority to simply ignore the statutory 
mandate to consider and act upon Energy Fuels Application. Consideration of the broader 
questions raised during the public comments must be addressed to the Congress of the 
United States or the Legislature of the State of Colorado. 
 
Dana’s conclusion acknowledges what the law fails to consider: public forums, such as those 
used during the licensing process, are a space for both proponents and opponents of an industrial 
project to express their concerns. Traditional public engagement, as per the AEA of 1954, are 




impacts of a particular project. Consequently, the entire panoply of concerns raised by 
proponents, be they social, economic, or even health and environmental, have little to no space 
for meaningful discussion. Dana’s suggestion that a more collegial environment could promote a 
“superior result” acknowledges a need for revision to the current regulatory structure. There is 
just one catch: even Dana’s conclusion assumes that the concerns raised by proponents are 
purely material in nature. Earlier in his conclusions, Dana constructs the argumentation of 
proponents of Piñon Ridge in a very one dimensional manner (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Ruling, 2013):  
Those public comments offered in support of the application and the proposed license 
cited primarily the economic opportunities to be realized by bringing additional 
employment to the west end of Montrose County. 
Evidence from my analysis shows that while economic opportunities are a large part of 
proponents’ argumentation (in fact they are the primary mode of argumentation), regarding the 
issues they bring up as simply being a plea for more jobs vastly oversimplifies the deep 
relationships between West Enders in favor of the mill and uranium milling itself. A more 
collegial environment as it pertains to the public engagement associated with uranium milling 
licenses is necessary, but so is a greater appreciation of the deep material and symbolic 
relationships between communities in the New Nuclear West and the material and industrial 
operations that brought them perceived stability and global relevance. The final section of my 
thesis will address this question, as well as the future of uranium milling in the New Nuclear 




The New Nuclear West’s Future 
What then, can we hope to learn from this study? First, as suggested in the explanation of 
the debacle surrounding the first two public meetings held by the CDPHE during 2010, the 
responsible state and federal agencies need to make a concerted effort to clarify the purpose and 
scope of the public engagement surrounding the uranium mill licensing process. CDPHE has 
already requested that the NRC, through the FSME, update the procedures it uses to guide the 
overview process of state managed uranium recovery programs, as it finds these policies are “old 
and outdated” (Erickson, May 16, 2012).  Since changing the AEA of 1954 to reflect the need for 
more inclusive policies and procedures related to the public engagement required of all 
Agreement States as per section 274 is a long-term goal, and a hopeful one at that, the NRC 
should first focus on formalizing what the CDPHE is inadvertently doing already. In Urbina’s 
January 2013 decision concerning the SMA’s appeal of the 2012 hearing, he acknowledges the 
need to consider information beyond the scope of environmental and health issues (Urbina, 2013, 
emphasis added):  
The department’s decision will be based upon an extensive review of the application, and 
associated documents and testimony, including documents and testimony submitted in 
the November hearing, and a consideration of the short-and long-term impacts of the 
proposed mill, including radiological and non-radiological impacts to water, air and 
wildlife, as well as economic, social and transportation-related impacts. 
 
Urbina’s recognition of the importance of both health/environmental as well as socioeconomic 
factors related to the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill project is a step in the right direction, and the 
NRC should actively direct Agreement States to balance all of these issues as they relate to the 
licensing of uranium and thorium processing facilities (Urbina, 2013). This will at least explicitly 





While this is occurring, CDPHE, in concurrence with the FSME, should consider new 
procedures for how to conduct the Radiation Control Act-mandated public meeting and hearing. 
In particular, the public meeting, with its nebulous structure, is an excellent space to apply the 
knowledge gained from recent studies in public engagement to create the more collegial 
environment mentioned by Judge Dana and Dr. Grossman. The public meeting has the advantage 
of mobility, and coupled with the lessons learned from my study, could apply the principles of 
public engagement outlined by such public engagement scholars as Susan Senecah, Jennifer 
Duffield Hamilton, and William Kinsella, to create a space where both proponents and 
opponents of a proposed uranium mill have the opportunity interact with each other, the CDPHE, 
and the company applying for the license (Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006; Kinsella, 2004; 
Senecah, 2004). While restructuring one of the two public engagement events associated with the 
mill licensing process may not provide a dynamic shift in the discourse associated with any 
particular project, it is a step in the right direction.  
However, incremental steps in the public engagement process are only part of the 
problem at hand; there remains the question of the discord between community perceptions of 
uranium development and the material reality of an industry that spent its last two booms under 
the protection of the U.S. government. With the exception of Amundson (2002) and Malin’s 
(2011) respective work, no major study in the last decade has grappled with the social and 
political aspects of the uranium industry in the American West. Even more importantly, only 
Amundson’s study examines the complex and oft conflicting history of uranium mining and 
milling in a region of the U.S. with a long history of federal intervention mixed with the struggle 
of former extractive industry communities to reorient their identity to grapple with the challenges 




Grappling with the shifting socioeconomic tides of the American West is a struggle all 
resource centric communities have/are going though, and the uranium industry towns of the New 
Nuclear West are no exception. Unlike the residents of such former mining towns in the 
American West as Red Lodge, Anaconda, and Hamilton, Montana, however, Piñon Ridge 
proponents, many of whom serve on the chambers of commerce for Nucla and Naturita, have 
seemingly rejected the notion of anything other than extractive industries as a solution to their 
region’s economic problems (Bryson & Wyckoff, 2010; Christensen, 2002). The question at this 
juncture is, why? While charting a path forward for the community is beyond the scope of this 
study, addressing this key question deserves a cursory discussion. Here, I would posit that 
geography plays a fundamental role in why the region has changed little since the end of the 
Cold War. Compared to other major uranium towns such as Moab and Grants, the West End 
does not lie along any major transit routes. By comparison, Moab lies along the U.S. 191, a 
major transit route in eastern Utah and the primary corridor to Canyonlands and Arches National 
Parks. Grants too sits along a major transit route, Interstate 40, which serves as one of the key 
highways for the movement of people and goods from the southern coastal states. The only other 
key uranium town with a similar level of geographic isolation is Jeffrey City, which today is a 
town in name alone. Viewed from this perspective, the fact that the West End has survived at all 
is a testament to the resilience of the West Enders and their commitment to staying in the region.  
Another factor that may also play into why the region has changed little in terms of 
socioeconomic opportunities since the 1980s is the sheer lack of options. With the exception of 
the Nucla Power Plant, a Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association electric cooperative 
plant, few to no facilities exist in the West End that employs a sizable number of individuals. In 




have proposed building a casino, though representatives of the community, including proponents 
of the Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill such as Don Coram, expect the project will never happen 
(Ballard, 2013).  
Thus, with few options on the table, some of them hinging upon navigating Colorado’s 
gambling laws, uranium, as the familiar source of development for the West End, becomes a 
logical pathway to the future. The Piñon Ridge Uranium Mill, provided it meets relevant state 
and federal regulations, can serve as a source of employment and economic growth for the 
region, but it should not serve as the end all, be all option. Energy Fuels, as a mid-major uranium 
producer by global standards, cannot fulfill the role of community expressed through the sorge-
enframing duality. The company is neither Union Carbide nor a development agency, and lacks 
the capital necessary to provide such far-reaching economic impacts. More so, it should not have 
to; as a publicly traded company, Energy Fuels is beholden to its shareholders to turn a profit, 
not provide opportunities for West Enders.   
If the mill is built, it will provide some opportunities, much as the Nucla power plant 
does, but it will not bring about a dynamic shift in West End life. With this in mind, community 
members should temper their expectations for what Piñon Ridge can do for their region. The old 
Nuclear West is gone; it left with the interest the federal government showed in developing a 
nuclear power industry. Uranium mining and milling in the New Nuclear West will only ever be 
a shadow of the boom times of the 1950s and 70s. Still, it can serve as a way of providing capital 
for the region’s development, but doing so will mean critically examining both the role of the 
industry and the ideas West Enders enframe it with. Sorge is a powerful mechanism through 
which to interface with the material world, but it hinges on grappling with the material world on 




industry provides within the complex intersection of past, present and future that is the New 




























GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
AEA of 1946: Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
AEA of 1954: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 
AEC: Atomic Energy Commission 
C.C.R.: Colorado Code of Regulations 
CDPHE: Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment 
CRS: Colorado Revised Statutes  
DOE: Department of Energy 
ERDA: Energy Research and Development Administration 
FSME: Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs (NRC) 
IUC: International Uranium Corporation 
JCAE: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
MED: Manhattan Engineer District 
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act 
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
RCA: Radiation Control Act (Colorado) 
 RTZ: Rio Tinto Zinc 
SMA: Sheep Mountain Alliance 
SX: Solvent Extraction 
WIPP: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant  
UCN: Union Carbide Nuclear 
UMDC: Union Mines Development Corporation  
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